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The Litigation Landscape of
Fraternity and Sorority Hazing:
Defenses, Evidence, and Damages
Gregory S. Parks* and Elizabeth Grindell**
Abstract
In recent years, increasing public and media attention has
focused on hazing, especially in collegiate fraternities and
sororities. Whether it is because of the deaths, major injuries, or
litigation, both criminal and civil, collegiate fraternities and
sororities have received increased scrutiny. In this Article, we
explore a range of tactical considerations that lawyers must
consider—from defenses to evidentiary concerns. We also explore
how damages are contemplated in the context of hazing
litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, legal scholars have increasingly
focused their attention on hazing. This research has spanned
organizational types—athletics,1 Asian fraternities,2 Black

1. See generally Gregory S. Parks & Nicolette DeLorenzo, Hazing in
High School Athletics: An Analysis of Victims, 29 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 451
(2019).
2. See generally Gregory S. Parks & Wendy Marie Laybourn, Asian
American Fraternity Hazing: An Analysis of Community-Level Factors, 22
UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 29 (2017).
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fraternities,3 Black sororities,4 white fraternities,5 white
sororities,6 marching bands,7 and the military.8 Much of this
work has drawn from disciplines outside of the law to explicate
the phenomenon of hazing,9 and some of it has been empirical in
3. See generally Gregory S. Parks & Matthew Hooker, Organizational
Ideology and Institutional Problem-Solving: Hazing Within Black Fraternities,
44 L. & PSYCH. REV. 91 (2020); Gregory S. Parks, “Midnight Within the Moral
Order”: Organizational Culture, Unethical Leaders, and Members’ Deviance,
40 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 115 (2014) [hereinafter Parks, “Midnight Within the
Moral Order”]; Gregory S. Parks et al., White Boys Drink, Black Girls
Yell . . . : A Racialized and Gendered Analysis of Violent Hazing and the Law,
18 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 93 (2015) [hereinafter Parks et al., White Boys
Drink, Black Girls Yell]; Gregory S. Parks et al., Menacing Monikers:
Language as Evidence, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 799 (2014) [hereinafter Parks
et al., Menacing Monikers]; Gregory S. Parks et al., Victimology, Personality,
and Hazing: A Study of Black Greek-Letter Organizations, 36 N.C. CENT. L.
REV. 16 (2013) [hereinafter Parks et al., Victimology, Personality, and Hazing].
4. See generally Gregory S. Parks & E. Bahati Mutisya, Hazing, Black
Sororities, and Organizational Dynamics, 43 L. & PSYCH. REV. 25 (2019);
Parks, “Midnight Within the Moral Order”, supra note 3; Parks et al., White
Boys Drink, Black Girls Yell, supra note 3; Parks et al., Menacing Monikers,
supra note 3; Parks et al., Victimology, Personality, and Hazing, supra note 3.
5. See generally Gregory S. Parks & Sabrina Parisi, White Boy Wasted:
Race, Sex, and Alcohol Use in Fraternity Hazing, 34 WIS. J.L., GENDER & SOC’Y
1 (2019); Parks et al., White Boys Drink, Black Girls Yell, supra note 3.
6. See generally Gregory S. Parks & Sarah J. Spangenburg, Hazing in
“White” Sororities: Explanations at the Organizational-Level, 30 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 55 (2019); Parks et al., White Boys Drink, Black Girls Yell, supra
note 3.
7. See generally Gregory S. Parks & Katherine E. Wenner, Making the
Band: Hazing and an Analysis of Interpersonal Dynamics, 18 VA. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 35 (2018).
8. See generally Gregory S. Parks & Jasmine Burgess, Hazing in the
United States Military: A Psychology and Law Perspective, 29 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (2019).
9. See Parks & Burgess, supra note 8, at 15 (investigating “the various
factors” that bear “on individuals and their decision to haze others”); Parks &
Hooker, supra note 3, at 93 (exploring “the system of ideas and ideals that form
the basis of culture and policy within black fraternities”); Parks & Wenner,
supra note 7, at 37 (contemplating “the issue of hazing from a social-ecological
approach”); Parks & DeLorenzo, supra note 1, at 490 (considering “how a
variety of cognitive biases influences the judgment and decision-making of
hazing victims”); Parks & Parisi, supra note 5, at 1 (analyzing “the extent to
which anxieties about race and masculinity influence hypermasculinity [and
hazing] amongst young white men”); Parks & Mutisya, supra note 4, at 29
(exploring “a subset of factors that influence hazing’s persistence”); Parks &
Spangenburg, supra note 6, at 94 (analyzing hazing’s causes through a
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nature.10 This has been helpful in elucidating what undergirds
and propels hazing and, as a result, why legal sanctions are
limited in their effectiveness in curtailing hazing. Nonetheless,
some scholars have offered a purely doctrinal analysis of
hazing.11 In this Article, we seek to do the same. In Part I, we
explore the various defenses that are put forth in hazing
litigation. In Part II, we explore the various evidentiary issues
that arise in hazing litigation. In Part III, we explore the various
damages that plaintiffs seek, and challenges to their recovery.
I.

LITIGATION DEFENSE

When injuries are sustained in a fraternity hazing incident,
plaintiffs pursuing litigation often name all possible parties as
defendants. Collegiate fraternities and sororities consist of
multiple entities—for example, the national organization;
regional, state, and local affiliates; and foundations—that work
in conjunction toward a concerted vision and mission.12 In the
context of litigation, any and all of these entities could be
defendants.13 However, fraternity and sorority national
organizations are structured to shield themselves from liability

“sensemaking, design-thinking, and the social-ecological model”); Parks &
Laybourn, supra note 2, at 32 (recognizing the “intersecting systems at the
individual, interpersonal, organizational, cultural, and societal levels” that
influence hazing behaviors).
10. See generally Gregory S. Parks et al., Hazing as Crime: An Empirical
Analysis of Criminological Antecedents, 39 L. & PSYCH. REV. 1 (2015); Parks et
al., White Boys Drink, Black Girls Yell, supra note 3; Gregory S. Parks et al.,
Complicit in Their Own Demise?, 39 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 938 (2014); Parks et al.,
Victimology, Personality, and Hazing, supra note 3; Gregory S. Parks et al.,
Belief, Truth, and Positive Organizational Deviance, 56 HOW. L.J. 399 (2013)
[hereinafter Parks et al., Belief, Truth, and Positive Organizational Deviance].
11. See Gregory S. Parks & Tiffany Southerland, The Psychology and Law
of Hazing Consent, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 7–14 (2013) (summarizing criminal and
civil treatment of consent and hazing).
12. See Whitney L. Robinson, Note, Hazed and Confused: Overcoming
Roadblocks to Liability by Clarifying a Duty of Care Through a Special
Relationship Between a National Greek Life Organization and Local Chapter
Members, 49 U. MEM. L. REV. 485, 493–94 (2019) (discussing fraternities’
structure and goal to “maintain the national brand”).
13. See id.
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for the local chapters’ and their members’ actions.14 While
plaintiffs may bring any number of claims against national
fraternities or sororities, national organizations often succeed
on various motions to dismiss, or they settle.15 As such, this Part
addresses various aspects of the litigation process in fraternity
hazing cases, including the role of insurance companies,
alternative dispute resolution and arbitration, and procedural
defenses, that may thwart litigation or significantly reduce
damages—specifically,
defenses
of
unconscionability,
comparative and contributory negligence, consent, and
third-party liability.
A.

Fraternities, Sororities, and Insurance Coverage

Hazing, alcohol abuse, and sexual assaults pose acute risks
of liability for fraternities and sororities across the country and
have led to an explosion of fraternity-related litigation.16 As a
result, many Greek-letter organizations have begun to obtain,
or attempt to obtain, liability insurance to combat these risks.17
Based on the severity of injury involved in many such cases,
these organizations understand the potential for enormous
verdicts or settlements. For example, a fraternity at the
University of Texas at Austin entered a settlement for $21
million after a fraternity member was thrown from a moving
truck and became permanently disabled.18 Many view
fraternities as a breeding ground for liability, leading
fraternities to become wary of the potential for litigation and its

14. See id. at 498.
15. See id. at 499, 506 (detailing the factors that make settlements
common).
16. See id. at 490 (“When injuries are sustained in a fraternity hazing
incident, civil litigation is likely to follow . . . .”); William C. Terrell, Note,
Pledging to Stay Viable: Why Fraternities and Sororities Should Adopt
Arbitration as a Response to the Litigation Dilemma, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 511,
521 (2012) (emphasizing that hazing-related litigation has “skyrocketed over
the last thirty years”).
17. See Shane Kimzey, Note, The Role of Insurance in Fraternity
Litigation, 16 REV. LITIG. 459, 460 (1997).
18. See id. at 463–64.
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serious financial consequences.19 As a consequence, insurance
has come to play a significant role with respect to Greek-letter
organizations.20
When a dispute involves diverse parties—for example,
“individuals involved in an incident, the chapter, the college or
university, the chapter’s house corporation, the national
fraternity, and certain chapter officers, usually the president,
the treasurer, and either the social chairman or the rush
chairman”“the fraternity’s insurer will usually direct those
brought into a suit in addition to the fraternity itself.”21 Insurers
have resisted providing insurance to such high-risk
organizations, making it difficult for Greek organizations to
secure adequate coverage.22 The National Association of
Insurance Commissioners ranked fraternities as only slightly
less risky than hazardous waste disposal companies and
asbestos contracts.23 In general, most fraternities will purchase
one comprehensive general liability policy on the national
fraternity level that also insures local chapters, their house
corporations, and their officers, members, and volunteers in the
scope of their duties for the fraternity.24 However, many
insurers do not provide coverage for hazing and sexual
assault—which are arguably the largest sources of liability for
these organizations.25

19. See id. at 466 (“One commentator has quipped that ‘[s]ubpoenas and
depositions may be replacing beer cans and pledge paddles as icons on
fraternity row.’” (alteration in original) (citing Gary Taylor, Increasingly
Vulnerable: Fraternities Face (Legal) Facts, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 31, 1990, at 26)).
20. See id. at 467–69.
21. Id. at 465–66.
22. See id. at 467 (“One university official has said that ‘fraternities “are
the third riskiest property to insure behind toxic waste dumps and amusement
parks.”’” (quoting Martha T. McCluskey, Privileged Violence, Principled
Fantasy, and Feminist Method: The Colby Fraternity Case, 44 ME. L. REV. 261,
306 n.197 (1992))).
23. See id. (“The Fraternity Insurance Purchasing Group (FIPG) manual
indicates that the National Association of Insurance Commissioners ranks
fraternities as the sixth worst risk, behind hazardous waste disposal
companies and asbestos contracts.”).
24. See id. at 472–75.
25. See id. at 473.
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Arbitration

Over the last three decades, national Greek organizations
have seen a significant increase in litigation resulting from
fraternity and sorority hazing practices and pledges’ injuries.26
Definitions of hazing are matters of state law, generally defined
as “any activity expected of someone joining or participating in
a group that humiliates, degrades, abuses, or endangers them
regardless of a person’s willingness to participate.”27 Such
activities often include punching, kicking, and other forms of
bodily harm, as well as psychological harm stemming from
verbal abuse, threats, humiliation, and ridicule.28
Unfortunately, hazing is not an uncommon occurrence in
Greek organizations, where “pledges” or “aspirants” are willing
to submit to or engage in rituals that can result in severe mental
and physical injury merely to earn membership.29 As students
continue seeking membership, courts have attempted to keep up
with the hazing litigation that inevitably results year after
year.30 Nonetheless, Greek organizations are turning to the
arbitration process to remain “viable,” because arbitration is
typically less costly, more confidential, and much faster than the
judicial process.31
Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),32 “[a]
written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such a contract . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at

26. See Terrell, supra note 16, at 514.
27. Id. at 513 (quoting ELIZABETH J. ALLEN & MARY MADDEN, HAZING IN
VIEW: COLLEGE STUDENTS AT RISK: INITIAL FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL STUDY
OF STUDENT HAZING 14 (2009)).
28. See id at 513–14 (pointing to statutory and judicial definitions of
hazing).
29. See Parks et al., Belief, Truth, and Positive Organizational Deviance,
supra note 10, at 419 (discussing research finding that “aspirants willingly
submit to hazing rituals in order to feel accepted by their peers”).
30. See Terrell, supra note 16, at 522–25 (surveying influential hazing
litigation cases from 1979 to 2007).
31. See id. at 544–54.
32. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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law or in equity for revocation of any contract.”33 The FAA was
enacted to “‘revers[e] centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements’ by ‘plac[ing] arbitration agreements upon the same
footing as other contracts.’”34 In determining whether
arbitration is appropriate in an individual case, courts apply
ordinary contract law principles.35 Under contract law
principles, a court may not direct the parties to arbitration
unless the agreement is valid.36
1.

Fraud in the Inducement

One rule in determining the validity of an arbitration
agreement is that courts may not direct the parties to
arbitration if the agreement was entered into through fraud in
the inducement.37 Fraud in the inducement generally consists of
(a) a misrepresentation (b) of a material fact (c) concerning the
subject matter of the contract, and (d) reliance by the other party
on the misrepresentation (e) in executing the contract (f) to his
or her detriment.38
When fraud in the inducement is alleged, the enforceability
of an arbitration clause will depend on two issues: (1) whether
federal or state arbitration law governs the contract, and (2)
whether the fraud is alleged as to the contract as a whole or as
to the arbitration clause itself. Under federal law, a court may
only hear a claim of fraudulent inducement as to the making of
the arbitration clause itself. The FAA provides that an
agreement to arbitrate any controversy arising out of a contract

33. Id.
34. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225–26 (1987)
(quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1974)).
35. See Griffen v. Alpha Phi Alpha, Inc., No. 06-1735, 2007 WL 707364,
at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2007) (“[T]he laws of the states yield ‘generally
applicable contract defenses’ to the validity of an agreement to arbitrate.”
(quoting Kiesel v. Lehigh Valley Eye Ctr., P.C., No. 05-4796, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 47486, at *11 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 2006))).
36. See id. at *7 (finding that an arbitration agreement was valid, and
thus, enforceable); Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir.
2003).
37. See Ex parte Perry, 744 So. 2d 859, 863 (Ala. 1999).
38. See Johnson Mobile Homes of Ala., Inc. v. Hathcock, 855 So. 2d 1064,
1067 (Ala. 2003).
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involving commerce is enforceable.39 In contrast, if the plaintiff
alleges fraud in the formation of the arbitration clause itself,
then the arbitration clause may not be enforceable.40 When a
claim is brought in court pertaining to a contract containing an
arbitration clause, the FAA requires that the court first ensure
that the “agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply
therewith is not in issue.”41 A claim of fraud in the inducement
of the actual arbitration clause is “an issue which goes to the
‘making’ of the agreement to arbitrate.”42 Thus, a claim of fraud
in the making of the arbitration clause itself will not be
compelled to go to arbitration; a court may consider that claim.43
For contracts not involving commerce, the FAA does not apply,
and relevant state law is binding.44 A majority of states have
adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act,45 the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act,46 or substantially similar legislation47
(collectively referred to throughout this Article as the UAA).
Most states that have adopted the UAA have followed the
separability doctrine articulated in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood
& Conklin Manufacturing Co.48 But a minority of states that
39. 9 U.S.C. § 2; see Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395, 400 (1967) (summarizing FAA provisions on the enforceability of
arbitration agreements).
40. See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 403 (providing that arbitration can
proceed if “the making of the agreement for arbitration” is not at issue).
41. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
42. Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 403–04.
43. See id.
44. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 201 (1956).
45. See UNIF. ARB. ACT (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2000),
https://perma.cc/4P5D-MNSJ (PDF).
46. See id. at prefatory note (discussing UAA and RUAA differences).
47. See id. at prefatory note; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-569.1–1-569.31 (2021)
(adopting a form of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act).
48. 388 U.S. 395 (1967); see id. at 404 (“[I]n passing upon . . . a stay while
the parties arbitrate, a federal court may consider only issues relating to the
making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate.”); e.g., Ericksen,
Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak St., 673 P.2d 251,
256 (Cal. 1983) (“[T]he majority rule, as reflected in cases like Prima
Paint . . . is compatible with California’s arbitration statute.”); Weinrott v.
Carp, 298 N.E.2d 42, 47 (N.Y. 1973) (“The result we suggest in this case is
consistent with the policy adopted by the Federal courts . . . .”); Shaffer v.
Jeffrey, 915 P.2d 910, 916, 916 n.12 (Okla. 1996) (collecting cases).
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have adopted the UAA have rejected the separability doctrine.49
In those states, a court will not compel arbitration, neither when
the fraud alleged pertains to the arbitration clause itself nor
when it pertains to the contract as a whole.50 Whether or not a
court will consider allegations of fraud in the inducement of the
contract will generally depend on the particular state.
Typically, fraud cannot exist without an “express
misrepresentation.”51 That misrepresentation can take the form
of either a “false statement of material fact”52 or the concealment
of “material facts when that person has a duty to disclose.”53
Generally, that fact must be either a past or existing fact.54 A
misrepresentation is fraudulent when, “to the knowledge or
belief of its utterer, it is false in the sense in which it is intended
to be understood by the recipient.”55 An expression of opinion
cannot be the basis of a claim of fraud.56
Concealment of a fact only constitutes fraud when the party
has a duty to disclose a material fact.57 That duty only arises in
special circumstances.58 For example, “[w]hen a party injects
himself into a business transaction,” a duty arises to “disclose
all material information necessary to prevent representations
49. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Jeffrey, 915 P.2d 910, 916, 916 (Okla. 1996)
(agreeing with “[c]ourts in Louisiana, Minnesota, and Tennessee [that] have
declined to” adopt Prima Paint’s reasoning). But see Signature Leasing, LLC
v. Buyer’s Grp., LLC, 466 P.3d 544, 549 (Okla. 2020) (noting that the
Oklahoma legislature effectively overruled Shaffer).
50. See, e.g., Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 917–18.
51. Lilliston v. Regions Bank, 653 S.E.2d 306, 310 (Ga. 2007) (quoting
Miller v. Lomax, 596 S.E.2d 232, 237 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)).
52. Gordon v. Lewis, 81 A.3d 491, 500 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013).
53. Id.
54. See James v. Integon Nat’l Ins. Co., 744 S.E.2d 491, 493 (N.C. Ct. App.
2013).
55. Miller v. Lockport Realty Grp., Inc., 878 N.E.2d 171, 179 (Ill. App. Ct.
2007) (quoting Soderlund Bros. v. Carrier Corp., 663 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995)).
56. See Soderlund Bros. v. Carrier Corp., 663 N.E.2d 1, 1011 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1995).
57. See Lilliston, 653 S.E.2d at 310–11 (upholding a grant of summary
judgement on a concealment claim because the parties lacked a duty to
disclose).
58. See Sletto v. Wesley Constr., Inc., 733 N.W.2d 838, 846 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2007).
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he makes . . . from misleading other parties . . . .”59 But when
parties deal at arms-length, there is no duty to disclose unless
there is a confidential relationship60 and the information is
actually requested.61 Additionally, a duty to speak can arise
from a partial disclosure.62 Consequently, even if there is
initially no duty to disclose, if a party chooses to speak, “then he
must make a full and fair disclosure of the matters he
discloses.”63 The duty has been characterized as one to “disclose
those facts that are material to the ones already stated so as to
make them truthful.”64
2.

Unconscionability

Another traditional contract doctrine that could prevent the
enforceability of an arbitration agreement in the context of
Greek-letter organizations is the doctrine of unconscionability.
Under relevant contract law, arbitration agreements between
individuals seeking fraternity membership and large fraternal
organizations may be unconscionable. Fraternities often have
greater bargaining power and superior knowledge, while
individual litigants are often young, lack requisite mental
capacity, and lack a meaningful choice to enter into such an
agreement. Because fraternal organizations are often
nationwide corporations and carry significant bargaining power,
arbitration agreements in these scenarios are rarely
59. Nat’l Consumer Coop. Bank v. Madden, 737 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (D.
Haw. 1990).
60. See Lilliston, 653 S.E.2d at 309–10 (concluding no duty to disclose
existed between the bank and its customer).
61. See Ladas Land & Dev., Inc. v. Merritt & Walding Props., LLP, 978
So. 2d 55, 59 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007); Gewin v. TCF Asset Mgmt. Corp., 668 So.
2d 523, 528 (Ala. 1995) (finding no duty where the sophisticated plaintiff never
asked about the information at issue).
62. See Ragland v. Shattuck Nat’l Bank, 36 F.3d 983, 992 (10th Cir. 1994)
(“In . . . cases involving the duty to disclose, . . . Oklahoma has followed the
rule that one who has no duty to speak, but makes a disclosure nevertheless,
undertakes to speak truthfully.” (citing MSA Tubular Prods., Inc. v. First
Bank & Tr. Co., 869 F.2d 1422, 1424 (10th Cir. 1989))).
63. Freese v. Smith, 428 S.E.2d 841, 846 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (citing
Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 209 S.E.2d 494, 501 (N.C. 1974)).
64. Freightliner, LLC v. Whatley Cont. Carriers, LLC, 932 So. 2d 883,
895 (Ala. 2005).
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negotiated.65 Individuals consent to these agreements on a
“take-it-or-leave-it” basis with little understanding of the
long-term implications of submitting to arbitration, which
typically favors parties that arbitrate more often.66 For these
reasons, and for several others, arbitration agreements between
litigants and large fraternal corporations may be deemed
unconscionable. Nonetheless, courts infrequently invalidate
arbitration agreements in these circumstances, even when the
agreements seem prima facie unconscionable.67
“As a defense to validity, unconscionability relieves a party
from an unfair contract or from an unfair portion of a contract.”68
The party asserting unconscionability bears the burden of proof,
and must show that a challenged arbitration agreement is both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable.69 A contract is
procedurally unconscionable when its formation reflects the
“absence of [a] meaningful choice on the part of one of the
parties.”70 One party to a contract is often found to lack a
meaningful choice when the contract is one of adhesion, or a
“boilerplate” contract that is “prepared by one party, to be signed
by the party in a weaker position . . . who has little choice about
the terms.”71 Specifically, contracts of adhesion present an offer
65. See, e.g., Griffen v. Alpha Phi Alpha, Inc., No. 06-1735, 2007 WL
707364, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2007) (describing the defendant fraternal
corporation
as
an
“international
organization . . . with . . . chapters
throughout the United States and foreign countries” that requires applicants
to sign and agree to abide by terms of its arbitration clause prior to becoming
members).
66. See Ostroff v. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 538, 543 (E.D.
Pa. 2006) (“Often the other party to the contract is told that the terms of the
contract are non-negotiable. There may also be conditions which prevent the
consumer from obtaining the product or services except by acquiescing to the
contract.” (internal citations omitted)).
67. See, e.g., Griffen, 2007 WL 707364, at *9 (“[T]he intent of all the
parties to this litigation to be bound by the compulsory arbitration of the
present claims is clear.”).
68. Id. at *4.
69. See id. at *58.
70. Witmer v. Exxon Corp., 434 A.2d 1222, 1228 (Pa. 1981) (quoting
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
71. Griffen, 2007 WL 707364, at *5 (quoting Kiesel v. Lehigh Valley Eye
Ctr., P.C., No. 05-4796, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47486, at *14 (E.D. Pa. July 12,
2006)).
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to a weaker party on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis, “prepared by a
party with excessive bargaining power.”72 Courts typically find
contracts of adhesion to be procedurally unconscionable.73 There
are several similarities between contracts of adhesion and
arbitration clauses,74 namely that parties with higher
bargaining power do not give weaker parties an opportunity to
negotiate, and that the weaker parties often lose the benefit of
the rest of the contract if they do not submit to the terms of the
arbitration agreement.75
A contract is substantively unconscionable when “the terms
of the arbitration clause itself . . . [are] unreasonably favorable
to the party with greater bargaining power.”76 Several examples
of substantively unconscionable arbitration agreements include:
arbitration
provision[s] . . . [that]
severely
restrict[]
discovery for the weaker party, place[] the burden of costs on
the weaker party, limit[] the remedies available to the
weaker party, limit[] the period in which the weaker party
may bring a claim, raise[] the burden of proof of claims
higher than the burden of proof in a judicial forum, or
provide[] only the stronger party with judicial recourse.77

Public policy also comes into play because substantive
unconscionability can be grounded in public policy principles,
“provided that the public policy is derived from law or precedent
and not couched in general terms of morality.”78 Several factors
can be assessed to determine if arbitration clauses in the hazing
context are unconscionable.
One of the main factors the unconscionability theory relies
on in challenging the validity of an arbitration agreement in
fraternity hazing litigation is the age of the fraternity member.
Age is of particular importance in considering unconscionability

72. Id.
73. See, e.g., id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Id. at *6 (citing Witmer, 434 A.2d at 1228).
77. Id. (citing Ostroff v. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 538,
543 (E.D. Pa. 2006)).
78. Id. at *7 (citing Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 76061 (Pa.
1994)).
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in fraternity arbitration clauses because it speaks to the relative
expertise and bargaining power of the parties to an arbitration
agreement. Although undergraduate students seeking
fraternity membership are typically over eighteen years of age
and are legally able to enter contracts, large institutions may
take advantage of students’ youth and any correlated
vulnerability.79 In Griffen v. Alpha Phi Alpha, Inc.,80 the
plaintiff, an Alpha Phi Alpha “aspirant” or pledge, submitted to
arbitration as a requirement to join the organization when he
was under the age of twenty-one.81 The court ultimately found
that the fraternity’s arbitration agreement was not
unconscionable, because the plaintiff failed to equate the risk of
not submitting to arbitration and not joining the fraternity to
more dire circumstances in which arbitration clauses were
found to be unconscionable.82
However, procedural and substantive unconscionability
requirements do not in themselves require that circumstances
be “dire.”83 For example, in Higgins v. Superior Court,84 the
court found that an arbitration agreement between a television
network and the twenty-one-year-old petitioner was
unconscionable, in large part because of the petitioner’s youth
and inferior knowledge of the agreement’s implications.85
Similarly, in fraternal organizations, potential members are
vulnerable to agreeing to an arbitration clause at an age at
which they have inferior knowledge of hazing and its risks

79. See Higgins v. Superior Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 293, 304 (Ct. App. 2006)
(“The . . . defendants
knew
petitioners
were
young
and
unsophisticated . . . . Indeed, it was petitioners’ vulnerability that made them
so attractive to the . . . defendants.”).
80. No. 06-1735, 2007 WL 707364 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2007).
81. Id. at *1–2.
82. Id. at *5. Some of these examples were the threat of eviction, see
generally Ostroff v. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 538 (E.D. Pa.
2006), and threat of economic livelihood, see generally Trailer Marine Transp.
Corp. v. Charley’s Trucking Inc., 20 V.I. 282 (1984).
83. Griffen v. Alpha Phi Alpha, Inc., No. 06-1735, 2007 WL 707364, at *5
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2007).
84. 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 293 (Ct. App. 2006).
85. See id. at 304.
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compared to the knowledge of the organization.86 Thus, courts
should render arbitration clauses in these situations
unenforceable.
A second factor of critical importance in determining the
unconscionability of an arbitration agreement in fraternity
hazing cases involves analysis of the relative bargaining power
of the parties. Courts analyze the bargaining power of both
parties to determine whether an arbitration clause is
substantively
unconscionable.87
The
substantive
unconscionability analysis looks at the arbitration clause itself
and determines if it “is unreasonably favorable to the party with
greater bargaining power.”88 Examples of unreasonably
favorable conditions could include cost-shifting provisions,
restrictions on remedies, prohibition of the right to appeal, or
one-sided access to the courts.89 These conditions are amplified
in cases in which an individual litigant challenges
hazing-related injuries against a large fraternal organization.90
Further, while “[a]dhesion is not a prerequisite for
“the
threshold
inquiry
of
an
unconscionability,”91
unconscionability analysis is whether the arbitration agreement
is adhesive.”92 Arbitration agreements in fraternity
“Membership Process Forms” or similar documents are
considered adhesive, are presented on a “take-it-or-leave-it”
86. Compare id. at 295, 303–04 (dealing with a twenty-one-year-old
plaintiff against a much more sophisticated party offering a contract with
nonnegotiable terms), with Griffen, 2007 WL 707364, at *55 (dealing with a
similarly aged plaintiff against a similarly sophisticated party offering a
nonnegotiable contract).
87. See Higgins, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 305 (examining the ability of the
parties to “compel arbitration without fearing that doing so would preclude
them from seeking injunctive or other equitable relief in a court of record”).
88. Griffen, 2007 WL 707364, at *6.
89. See id. (enumerating criteria of substantive unconscionability);
Ostroff, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 54547 (same).
90. See Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 695, 711 (2001) (“Because of the lack of court oversight, arbitration
critics fear that arbitrators will disregard the applicable law—particularly
laws that favor individuals over corporations.”).
91. Higgins v. Superior Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 293, 301 (Ct. App. 2006)
(quoting Harper v. Ultimo, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 418, 424 (Ct. App. 2003)).
92. THOMAS H. OEHMKE & JOAN M. BROVINS, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
§ 10:18 (3d ed. 2020).
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basis to suggest uneven bargaining power, and are limited to the
remedies available to the weaker party.93 Accordingly, these
agreements are procedurally and substantively unconscionable
in spite of the fact that courts may not find the inability to join
a Greek organization to be “dire.”94 A large fraternal
organization has much higher bargaining power than individual
litigants, particularly when individuals agree to whatever terms
the organization suggests in order to gain prestigious
membership.95 The plaintiff’s youth in Griffen likewise amplifies
the unequal bargaining power as not only between an individual
and a large organization, but also between a very young
individual and a sophisticated, nationwide fraternity.96
Therefore, courts should find that, in these instances,
arbitration agreements are unconscionable and thus
unenforceable.
A third factor to consider when evaluating the potential
unconscionability of an arbitration agreement of this type is
whether the pledge had a meaningful choice in the formation of
the agreement. As in other contexts, enforcement of arbitration
clauses in the hazing context should be deemed unconscionable
if the potential member lacks a meaningful choice. When one
93. See Griffen v. Alpha Phi Alpha, Inc., No. 06-1735, 2007 WL 707364,
at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2007).
94. See id. (distinguishing Griffen’s circumstances from, for example,
those in Ostroff where the “plaintiff’s elderly mother was evicted from her
former home and had no place to live but for the defendant’s assisted living
community”).
95. See Terrell, supra note 16, at 546 (“It has long been held that fraternal
organizations have the power to determine the path of their membership at
will, without judicial interference.”).
96. It is important to note that, like in Griffen, many courts do not strike
an arbitration agreement as unconscionable in similar scenarios. See OEHMKE
& BROVINS, supra note 92, § 10:9
A mere disparity in bargaining power between contracting parties,
standing alone, does not make a contract unconscionable. Indeed,
mere inequality or disparity in bargaining power is insufficient to
invalidate an arbitral agreement. Indeed, to topple an ADR
agreement, the resulting contract terms must be so one-sided as to
be oppressive, or the party with superior bargaining power (i.e.,
dominant party) must have taken unfair advantage of the weaker
counter-party. Nothing is unconscionable about a party consciously
surrendering the right to ordinary judicial procedures in favor [of]
arbitration.
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party in an arbitration agreement lacks a meaningful choice, it
is altogether unfair to enforce the agreement.97 When
determining an absence of a meaningful choice for a weaker
party, courts should analyze, inter alia, whether the party
suffered an injury, the relative disparity in the party’s
bargaining power, and the parties’ relative sophistication.98
In Anderson v. Ashby,99 the Supreme Court of Alabama
concluded that the arbitration clause between the parties was
unenforceable because the clause attempted to force the
defendants to spend considerable time and money to find
another finance company and potentially lose the financing from
the plaintiff.100 Similarly, in the hazing context, arbitration
clauses do not give the potential member a meaningful choice
because the individual either is required to sign the contract to
join the fraternity or is not allowed to join at all and may lose
the ability to join another fraternal organization.101 In addition,
fraternal organizations tend to be more knowledgeable and
sophisticated in regard to hazing, its risks, and the implications
of arbitration in these cases than the potential member. As
discussed above, fraternal organizations also have higher
bargaining power than the potential member. Additionally,
because parties choose a preferred arbitrator, a large,
experienced organization may be in a better position to make
such a choice and the chosen arbitrator may accordingly favor
the organization.102 Thus, courts should conclude that
97. See Smith v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 790 S.E.2d 1, 4 (S.C. 2016).
98. See Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 644 S.E.2d 663, 669 (S.C.
2007) (stating that courts “should take into account . . . whether there is an
element of surprise in the inclusion of the challenged clause[] and the
conspicuousness of the clause” (citing Carlson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 883 F.2d
287, 293 (4th Cir. 1989))).
99. 873 So.2d 168 (Ala. 2003).
100. See id. at 179.
101. See Griffen, 2007 WL 707364, at *1 (“The Fraternity required all
aspirants, including Mr. Griffen, to complete an Official Application for
Membership [containing an arbitration clause] in order to become a member
of the Fraternity.”).
102. See Drahozal, supra note 90, at 708–09. In choosing an arbitrator, the
parties “circulate[] a list of prospective arbitrators . . . strike objectionable
names, rank the rest, and the highest ranking remaining name serves as the
arbitrator.” Id. at 709. This process, while presented simply, inevitably proves
challenging for parties with weaker bargaining power who likely cannot
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arbitration clauses in the hazing context are unconscionable
because the potential member lacks a meaningful choice.
The fourth and final factor commonly considered in
determining the unconscionability of arbitration clauses in
fraternity hazing cases relates to a pledge’s mental capacity or
capacity to contract. The question of mental incapacity in the
context of arbitration agreements is determined by courts and
not by an arbitrator. “If the making of an arbitration agreement
or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue,
the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.”103 Courts
have interpreted this provision of the FAA to require that courts
decide the applicability of mental capacity defenses.104 In the
hazing context, potential members could be vulnerable to
agreeing to an arbitration clause without the requisite mental
capacity to render such an agreement enforceable. In these
instances, courts have concluded that it should be the court,
rather than an arbitrator, that determines if the arbitration
clause is enforceable.
Although courts strictly limit scenarios in which they find
arbitration clauses to be unconscionable in fraternity hazing
cases, such agreements may lend themselves to findings of both
procedural and substantive unconscionability and may thus be
unenforceable.

identify “objectionable” arbitrators or “rank” potential options in the same way
a large fraternal organization can. See id. at 708.
103. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
104. See Amirmotazedi v. Viacom, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 256, 263 (D.D.C.
2011) (“Because th[e] mental capacity defense goes to the formation, or the
‘making’ of the Arbitration Agreement, under § 4 of the FAA it must be decided
by this Court.”); Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir. 2003) (“We hold
that Spahr’s mental incapacity defense naturally goes to both the entire
contract and the specific agreement to arbitrate in the contract. Therefore,
Spahr’s claim . . . placed the ‘making’ of an agreement to arbitrate at issue
under § 4 of the FAA.”); Est. of Grimm v. Evans, 251 P.3d 574, 577 (Colo. App.
2010) (“Even when aimed at the entire contract, the [mental capacity] defense
must be resolved by a court (and not an arbitrator) because it denies that ‘an
agreement to arbitrate exists’ . . . .” (citation omitted)).
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Assumption of Risk, Comparative Fault, and Contributory
Negligence

Victims of hazing incidents often find that criminal charges
against hazing perpetrators are inadequate to address their
harm. In most cases, criminal sanctions impose only minimal
punishments at the misdemeanor level.105 By contrast, hazing
victim plaintiffs have a much better chance of meaningful
compensation in an action in civil court.106 As such, many
victims and victims’ parents file personal injury suits to achieve
more legitimate recovery and vindication.107 The development of
hazing case law, and the enactment and enhancement of state
anti-hazing statutes, have—not surprisingly—resulted in
various defenses.108 These include comparative fault,
contributory negligence, and assumption of risk.109 Comparative
fault and contributory negligence both suggest that the plaintiff
“knew or should have known” of the risk that resulted in their
harm.110 While the former allows for recovery based on the
degree (percentage) to which the plaintiff was at fault, the latter
is a bar to recovery.111
Another defense fraternities use in litigation is that a
plaintiff cannot recover for injuries sustained if the plaintiff
assumed the risks of foreseeable injuries involved in performing
the activity that caused their harm. The general principle of

105. See Parks et al., Complicit in Their Own Demise?, supra note 10, at
941.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Ballou v. Sigma Nu Gen. Fraternity, 352 S.E.2d 488, 49495
(S.C. Ct. App. 1986) (claiming the defenses of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk).
110. Parks et al., Complicit in Their Own Demise?, supra note 10, at 942
(citing Weil v. Selzer, 873 F.2d 1453, 1457 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
111. Id. at 942–43. Some states, such as South Carolina, bar recovery in
tort on the plaintiff’s behalf for contributory negligence but refuse to apply the
doctrine to fraternity hazing cases. See Ballou, 352 S.E.2d at 495 (barring the
use of the contributory negligence defense because the defendant fraternity’s
conduct leading to the decedent’s death was willful); Parks et al., Complicit in
Their Own Demise?, supra note 10, at 943 (discussing the implications of the
Ballou decision in South Carolina).
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assumption of risk is that “[a] plaintiff who voluntarily assumes
a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of
the defendant cannot recover for such harm.”112 A defense of
assumption of risk can also be established through the concept
of implied assumption of risk. According to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts Section 496C, implied assumption of risk
occurs when “a plaintiff fully understands the risk of harm
caused by the defendant’s conduct” and the plaintiff “voluntarily
chooses” to remain engaged in the situation in which that risk
exists.113 Implied assumption of risk can be further subdivided
into two categories: primary implied assumption of risk and
secondary implied assumption of risk.114 The elements that must
be proven to show primary implied assumption are that the
plaintiff: (1) had knowledge of the risk, (2) appreciated the risk,
and (3) had a choice to avoid, but voluntarily chose to accept, the
risk.115 Primary implied assumption requires only that the
plaintiff has knowledge of the risk,116 whereas secondary
assumption requires the plaintiff to have knowledge of a risk
that was directly created by the defendant’s breach of a duty.117
Some courts have rejected tort defense doctrines like
assumption of risk in hazing cases on the ground that hazing
victims fail to fully appreciate the dangers involved.118 For
example, in Ex parte Barran,119 a fraternity defended itself
against claims arising out of a hazing incident by asserting that
the plaintiff, Jones, assumed the risks of the hazing process by
“consciously and voluntarily participating in the hazing
activities.”120 In response, Jones argued that he did not assume
any risks and that “his participation was ‘not necessarily

112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (AM. L. INST. 1965).
113. Id. § 496C.
114. See Bennett v. Hidden Valley Golf & Ski, Inc., 318 F.3d 868, 873 n.3
(8th Cir. 2003).
115. See Reimer v. City of Crookston, 326 F.3d 957, 966 (8th Cir. 2003).
116. See id. at 966 (citing Wegscheider v. Plastics, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 167,
170 (Minn. 1980).
117. See Bennett, 318 F.3d at 873 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003).
118. See, e.g., Ballou, 352 S.E.2d at 495.
119. 730 So. 2d 203 (Ala. 1998).
120. Id. at 205.
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voluntary.’”121 In this case, Jones was subjected to numerous
paddlings, gauntlet runs, and other hazing rituals over the
course of a full academic year.122 University officials, as well as
Jones’s parents, had asked if he was being hazed, but he chose
not to tell them that he needed assistance or intervention.123
Further, Jones continued to participate in the hazing rituals
until he was suspended from the university for poor academic
performance, despite knowing that between 20 and 40 percent
of pledges had ended their pledgeship due to hazing.124 These
facts led the court to conclude that his participation was
voluntary and that he had assumed the risk of injury related to
these hazing activities.125 On appeal the Court of Civil Appeals
reversed, reasoning that “in today’s society numerous college
students are confronted with the great pressures associated
with fraternity life and . . . compliance with the initiation
requirements [that] place[] the students in a position of
functioning in what may be construed as a coercive
environment.”126 The Court of Civil Appeals held that
assumption of risk did not support summary judgment against
Jones.127
D.

Consent

Some defendants turn to victim consent as an affirmative
defense and a bar to recovery.128 When a plaintiff attempts to
show that a battery (which is committed without consent)
should form a basis for tort recovery, the impact of intent in the

121. Id. at 205–06.
122. Id. at 205.
123. Id. at 206.
124. Id. at 207.
125. Id. at 205.
126. Jones v. Kappa Alpha Order, Inc., 730 So. 2d 197, 200 (Ala. Civ. App.
1997), rev’d in part sub nom. Ex parte Barran, 730 So. 2d 203 (Ala. 1998).
127. Id.
128. See Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battery:
Confusion and Controversy, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1585, 1605 (2012) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 13(a) (AM. L. INST. 1934)); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (AM. L. INST. 1979).
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battery claim becomes of critical importance.129 In Davies v.
Butler,130 for example, the court held that “consent is not
effective as a defense to battery ‘where the beating is excessively
disproportionate to the consent, given or implied, or where the
party injured is exposed to loss of life or great bodily harm.’”131
Further, “capacity to consent requires the mental ability to
appreciate the ‘nature, extent and probable consequences of the
conduct consented to.’”132
Often, consent is not a fruitful defense in hazing cases. In
sixteen states, legislatures have added provisions to their
existing anti-hazing statutes that bar the victim-consent
defense, while in others, the statutes provide for a presumption
against consent or a presumption of per se forced activity.133 The
language of such provisions varies. Some make consent
irrelevant to charges under their respective anti-hazing

129. See Parkell v. Danberg, 21 F. Supp. 3d 339, 359 (D. Del. 2014), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 833 F.3d 313 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Lack of
consent is an essential element of assault and battery. The intent necessary
for battery is the intent to make contact with the person, not the intent to
cause harm.” (internal citations omitted)).
130. 602 P.2d 605 (Nev. 1979).
131. Id. at 612 (quoting Wright v. Starr, 179 P. 877, 878 (1919)).
132. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. b (AM. L.
INST. 1979)).
133. See Amie Pelletier, Regulation of Rites: The Effect and Enforcement of
Current Anti-Hazing Statutes, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
377, 386 n.75 (2002) (listing state statutes with anti-hazing measures); id. at
386 (stating that any hazing activity is “presumed to be ‘forced’ activity, the
willingness of an individual to participate in such activity notwithstanding”
(citing 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5352 (1992), repealed by 28 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 2801–2811 (2021)). When it repealed this statute, the Pennsylvania
legislature created an entirely new anti-hazing title. That title does not retain
the quoted language; however, the new statute states that consent, whether
“sought or obtained,” “shall not be a defense to any offense” under the new
anti-hazing title. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2806 (2021). Similarly, Delaware’s
anti-hazing statute mimics the same language. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14,
§ 9302 (2021) (providing that any activity within the statutory definition of
“hazing” is “presumed to be ‘forced’ activity, the willingness of an individual to
participate in such activity notwithstanding”); see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 1190 (2021) (stating that any hazing activity is “presumed to be a forced
activity, even if the student willingly participates in such activity”).
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statutes134 and others explicitly remove consent as a
consideration altogether;135 but they nonetheless improve the
likelihood of a favorable judgment for the plaintiff involved in
hazing litigation. They also signal a trend toward legislative
understanding of the various social pressures that hazing
victims face. These pro-plaintiff additions lessen or eliminate
the need for subjective inquiry into victims’ mental abilities and
the effect of social pressures the individual may have faced in a
given context.136 By simplifying the judicial process in this way,
hazing litigation can be more streamlined and victims’ ability to
assert their rights and ultimately obtain a favorable judgment
is reinforced.
III. EVIDENTIARY MATTERS
The evidence used in cases involving hazing injuries and
deaths has evolved and expanded as litigation involving
Greek-letter organizations has become more common.137 Much
of this evidence is used to analyze the underlying values held by
such organizations, which may inform the policies and practices
Greek organizations employ, as well as the perception of
members and pledges as to their experience with hazing
134. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 708.10 (2021) (including “forced activity” within
the definition of prohibited acts, but not applying a presumption that hazing
activities are “forced” per se); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-61 (2021).
135. See, e.g., Pelletier, supra note 133, at 386–87 (stating that Nevada’s
anti-hazing statute provides that “[c]onsent of a victim of hazing is not a valid
defense to a prosecution conducted [under the anti-hazing statute]” (quoting
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.605(2) (2001))); MO. REV. STAT. § 578.365(4) (2021)
(“Consent is not a defense to hazing.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 570j(d) (2021)
(“It is not a defense . . . that the person against whom the hazing was directed
consented to or acquiesced in the hazing activity.”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW
§ 3-607(c) (LexisNexis 2021) (“The implied or express consent of a student to
hazing is not a defense.”); IND. CODE § 35-42-2-2.5 (2020) (“‘[H]azing’ means
forcing or requiring another person with or without the consent of the other
person . . . to perform an act that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury.”
(emphasis added)); W. VA. CODE § 18-16-2 (2021) (“[T]he implied or expressed
consent or willingness of a person or persons to hazing may not be a defense
under this section.”).
136. See Pelletier, supra note 133, at 386.
137. See Gregory S. Parks & Rashawn Ray, Poetry as Evidence, 3 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 217, 221 (2013) (describing BGLO pledges’ knowledge of poems
as useful evidence in hazing litigation).
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rituals.138 More specifically, these symbolic practices become
emblematic of traits such as reverence for tradition,
perseverance, endurance, and loyalty, among others.139 Though
these practices arguably give insight into the psyche of pledges
and members who participate in ritualized hazing, questions
remain about the admissibility of such sources in court
proceedings.140 In addition to these elements, this Part analyzes
other sources of evidence, like information from social media,
organizational culture, application of select discovery devices,
and the role of expert witnesses.
A.

Poems and Songs, Signs, and Symbols

The proliferation of fraternity and sorority hazing litigation
has led to an evolution in the types of evidence employed in such
litigation. Pledges’ poems, songs, chants, and greetings to
members may provide indicia of what they knew about their
hazing experience and when they knew it.141 For example, Black
Greek-letter organization (BGLO) pledges learn poems as part
of their pledge process.142 These poems often reflect an

138. See id. at 238 (describing songs and poems that touch on the sacrifice,
hardship, and suffering that pledges experience throughout the pledge
process).
139. See id. at 221 (noting that BGLOs provide “institutional frameworks,
a sense of community, life-long fictive kinship ties, ritual, and a politic of racial
uplift”).
140. See id. at 237 (describing a case in which evidence of racist lyrics was
barred due to the risk of undue prejudice).
141. See id. at 221. “The use of song lyrics as evidence provides a useful
analog to the type of evidence that might be used in civil BGLO hazing
litigation.” Id. at 228. “Over the past several decades, both state and federal
courts have increasingly allowed for the admissibility of song lyrics as evidence
in criminal trials.” Id. at 238–46.
142. See id. at 240
Many BGLOs have specific poems that members learn either as
part of the initiation process or in the context of the organization’s
broader culture. The poems “If” and “Invictus” have special
significance in Black Greek life, as they are the only two poems that
BGLO members seem to collectively share regardless of sorority or
fraternity affiliation, generation, or region of the country. The
poems not only are enduring favorites in the English-speaking
world, but also play a central role in Black “Greek” life discourse.
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understanding of themes like hardship and perseverance.143
Similarly, BGLO pledge chants, greetings, and songs often
bespeak of enduring brutality.144
Signs and symbols may play an important evidentiary role
in hazing litigation. Organizational symbolism is a system of
behavior and meaning that helps organizations provide
identification schemas for outsiders as well as members.145 For
example, Alpha Phi Alphaa BGLO that prides itself on being
an organization for strong, intelligent African-American
menuses the image of a Sphinx as a symbol of strength,
history, African-American heritage, mystery, and guidance.146
Many members see the Sphinx as a positive image for the
fraternity and as a corporeal representation of the principles of
the fraternity.147 On the other hand, Alpha’s other well-known
symbol, an image of an ape, receives mixed reactions from
members of the fraternity, as some consider the obvious racist
connotations of equating African-American men with apes to be
uncomfortable.148
Symbols serve four primary functions: “(1) to reflect
organizational culture, (2) to serve as a trigger of internalized

143. See id. at 252 (citing statistical data regarding pledges’
interpretations of these poems).
144. See Parks et al., Complicit in Their Own Demise?, supra note 10, at
952–53
Nearly 90 percent of fraternity members and 85 percent of sorority
members learned or made up at least one song, chant, or greeting
about the pledge experience. This is an overwhelming majority of
respondents who were introduced to information about the pledge
process and what it means to pledge. A much smaller percentage,
however, report learning songs, chants, or greetings that suggested
hazing. While 56 percent of fraternity members report learning
information that suggested hazing, only 16 percent of sorority
members do. Although a similar gender gap exists, an even lower
percentage of respondents report making up songs, chants, or
greetings that suggested hazing. Thirty-seven percent of fraternity
members and 13 percent of sorority members report making up
information that suggested hazing.
145. See GREGORY S. PARKS & JOANNA S. HUNTER, ALPHA PHI ALPHA: A
LEGACY OF GREATNESS, THE DEMANDS OF TRANSCENDENCE 51–53 (2011).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 53.
148. Id.
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norms and values, (3) to act as a frame for conversations about
experience, and (4) to serve as an integrator of organizational
systems of meaning.”149 In the case of BGLOs in particular,
these symbols and iconography reflect the fraternity’s
organizational identity by demonstrating its links to African
culture and society.150 These connections are made both
consciously and unconsciously.151 By associating such images
with the fraternity, members learn a framework for behavior
and personal identity, while the organization as a whole
develops a strong group identity.152
In addition to visual symbols, many BGLO chapters take on
monikersfor example, “Bloody,” “Deadly,” or “Ruthless.”153
Having a chapter moniker makes it more likely that a fraternity
chapter will receive a cease and desist order and be suspended
at the university and organizational levels.154 Having menacing,
as opposed to benign (for example, “Mighty”), monikers also
results in more hazing activity accusations.155 As such, chapters
with menacing monikers tend to be labeledfairly or
unfairlyas more likely to be involved in hazing.156 Not
surprisingly, judges may allow such monikers to be admitted
into evidence at their discretion, after weighing the monikers’
probative value against their prejudicial impact.157 In the

149. Id. at 51 (citation omitted).
150. Id. at 52.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 51.
153. See Parks et al., Menacing Monikers, supra note 3, at 800 (stating that
BGLOs have monikers that denote their endorsements of violence in the
context of hazing).
154. See id. at 807 (showing that having a chapter moniker increased the
chances of receiving a cease-and-desist order by 78 percent and the risk of
suspension by 64 percent).
155. See id. at 810 (“[T]he presence of a menacing moniker leads to more
accusations of hazing activity, but not necessarily to more suspensions. This
suggests that menacing monikers may be a stigma that influences external
perception, but may not lead to any real consequences for organizations that
employ them.”).
156. See id.
157. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair
prejudice.”); see also Petrilli v. United States, 129 F.2d 101, 104 (8th Cir. 1942)
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context of hazing, there have not been clear answers to whether
monikers will be allowed as evidence.
B.

Social Media

When building hazing cases, social media and technology
provide an opportunity to bring transparency to the secrecy and
silence of hazing because they can make private acts visible to
the public and provide additional evidence of hazing in lawsuits.
Today, phones and social media provide additional evidence to
strengthen the visibility and validity of hazing claims. Although
common law is generally silent on the correlation between social
media and hazing cases, there are a few examples in which
social media is used as further evidence of hazing and
harassment. For example, in J.J. v. Olympia School District,158
male student athletes at a high school practiced a hazing ritual
referred to as Boys Next Door (“BND”)—anal penetration of
hazing victims.159 The fact that unidentified students created a
Facebook page where they threatened other students with BND
online was an indication that this form of hazing was a common
practice at the high school.160 An “ongoing culture of sexual
harassment” at the high school was one of the bases for the
plaintiff’s claims, and the existence of the Facebook page was
evidence supporting the existence of this culture.161
In Green v. Jacksonville State University,162 a band referred
to as “STL” used a Facebook page to harass new members,
particularly those who were African American.163 STL members
posted a number of racist memes and jokes on the STL Facebook
page.164 In addition, after the plaintiff informed the school about
the harassment that he faced from STL members, one of the
members posted a “terroristic image of a Confederate battle
(stating that a defendant can request that aliases be omitted, until their
relevance has been properly developed, in order to “protect himself”).
158. No. C16-5060, 2017 WL 347397 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2017).
159. Id. at *1.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. No. 16-CV-1047, 2017 WL 2443491 (N.D. Ala. June 6, 2017).
163. Id. at *8.
164. See id.
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flag,” which the plaintiff understood to be an allusion to white
supremacy and a direct threat.165 These Facebook posts were
used as evidence to support the plaintiff’s claim of harassment
on the basis of race in court.166 But in order for social media posts
to be admissible, they must be relevant to the claim in the case
at bar.167 In Vega v. Sacred Heart University,168 the court refused
to enter Facebook entries into evidence because, though they
were from a person of interest in the hazing case, they were not
relevant to any of the issues in the case.169
In Burch v. Young Harris College,170 one of the plaintiffs
was previously a pledge of Gamma Psi sorority.171 As a pledge,
the plaintiff was subjected to five nights of hazing as a
precondition to membership in the organization.172 The plaintiff
was blindfolded, required to stand, kneel, sit, and swim in a cold
creek, as well as be berated and criticized by sorority and
fraternity members.173 The plaintiff disclosed her hazing
experience to an administrator at the school, who used copies of
online exchanges among sorority members to confirm the
plaintiff’s claim of hazing.174
In addition to cell phone use and social media’s relevance to
gathering evidence for a hazing case, news outlets have also
reported on the importance of technology and social media in
bringing transparency to the issue of hazing.175 In 2015, an
Indiana University chapter of Alpha Tau Omega had its charter
revoked after a video circulated online showing a hazing ritual

165. Id. at *10.
166. Id. at *7–10.
167. See FED. R. EVID. 402 (“Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.”).
168. No. 3:10CV1870, 2013 WL 12284587 (D. Conn. Jan. 2, 2013).
169. Id. at *2 (barring admission of Facebook entries of an alleged
harasser’s involvement in a separate entity during January of 2009 when the
hazing at issue occurred during the night between October 2 and 3, 2008).
170. No. 2:13-CV-64-WCO, 2013 WL 11319423 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 9, 2013).
171. Id. at *1.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id. at *2–3.
175. See, e.g., Jessica Mendoza, Indiana Fraternity Hazing Video Shows
Social Media’s Positive Impact, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 8, 2015),
https://perma.cc/6K7E-YZ8F.
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that involved sexual misconduct.176 Also in 2015, members of the
University of Oklahoma chapter of Sigma Alpha Epsilon were
suspended and the chapter shut down after a cell
phone-recorded video clip surfaced that showed the members
singing along to a racist chant.177 In September of 2015, Ohio’s
Miami University shut down a fraternity after it discovered, via
Snapchat and text messages, that the fraternity banned pledges
from shaving or showering.178 Psychologist Susan Lipkins stated
that “social media . . . give[s] a face” to these realities—“[w]hen
someone leaks [videos] to social media, we can’t deny it
anymore.”179 On the other hand, Kim Novak, an expert and
consultant in student-focused risk management, stated,
“[F]ootage and images lack context [because] ‘a picture is a
moment in time,’ and a minute-long video doesn’t tell the whole
story.”180
Social media and the advancement of technology are used
to provide evidence to build hazing cases. Often, posts on social
media may provide context or additional evidence to prove
elements of a hazing or harassment claim.181 On the other hand,
pictures and videos disseminated through social media may be
taken out of context because they do not provide all the facts of
the situation. Although the information is limited, it appears
that a few jurisdictions have used social media posts to provide
additional evidence of hazing.182 Overall, technological
advancement is bringing transparency and visibility to the issue
of hazing through the media and in courts of law.
C.

Organizational Culture of Hazing

Courts have been slow to hold national organizations liable
for failing to recognize the greater social influences and
pressures in fraternal organizations that lead to an
organizational culture of hazing both locally and nationally. In
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Susan Lipkins).
Id. (quoting Kim Novak).
See id.
Id.
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Commonwealth v. Pi Delta Psi, Inc.,183 the Pennsylvania
Superior Court made the following declaration:
This corporation, though vicariously liable to make redress
for the illegalities of its agent, did not kill anyone. While its
negligent management may have fostered a corporate
culture that permitted or even encouraged wanton behavior
by student members, the corporation did not tackle or
physically attack anyone. It has no body with which to do
so.184

This declaration provided the basis for the court’s finding
that a “trial court may fashion new terms of probation to
monitor how the corporation conducts its business . . . and
whether it is taking steps nationally to reform its corporate
culture of hazing.”185
In Edwards v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Inc.,186 Donald
Edwards alleged that the national fraternity acted with wanton
disregard by allowing an “aura of violence” at the university at
which he was matriculating.187 Consequently, fraternity chapter
members and others hazed him.188 The court found this “aura”
to be insufficient evidence that the national fraternity acted in
wanton disregard for the rights of others and granted summary
judgment for the national fraternity on the issue of punitive
damages resulting from any of its alleged negligence.189
Similarly, in Morrison v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity,190
Kendrick Morrison and his parents sought to offer evidence of
Kappa hazing incidents at universities other than Louisiana
Tech University, where he had been a student, to show a
nationally tolerated culture of hazing within Kappa.191 The trial
court limited the use of evidence of hazing at other
183. 211 A.3d 875 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019).
184. Id. at 892.
185. Id.
186. No. 98 C 1755, 1999 WL 1069100 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1999).
187. Id. at *4.
188. Id.
189. See id. at *8.
190. 31805 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/24/99); 738 So. 2d 1105, writ denied, 99-1607
(La. 9/24/99); 749 So. 2d 634.
191. See id. at 1112.
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universities,192 and “instructed plaintiffs and their counsel that
the court would not allow any further reference to specific
hazing incidents at other universities.”193 The court of appeals
concluded that the “trial court properly limited [the] plaintiffs
to the presentation of non-specific testimony that hazing
occurred both before and after” the national fraternity issued an
order prohibiting hazing, and defendants were not entitled to de
novo review on appeal.194
These cases illustrate that courts are reluctant to establish
precedent that allows the culture of hazing to serve as a basis
for liability for injuries alleged to result from this culture. But it
can be argued that, by taking this narrow view, courts are
failing to deter national and local organizations’ ambivalence to
such cultures. Instead of preventing a culture of hazing by
pinning prospective liability on a national or local fraternity’s
culture of hazing, courts have instead turned to retroactive
methods of probation to address this broad-reaching issue.
D.

Discovery Devices

Three discovery devices are commonly used in hazing
litigation, especially against organizational defendants. This
Section focuses on these three devices—interrogatories,
requests for production of documents, and depositions. While
most hazing litigation takes place in state court, we provide a
framework of analysis from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

192. Id. The national fraternity objected to the student’s mother’s
unsolicited and unresponsive reference to a killing arising out of hazing at
another university. Id. The court stated that it had reviewed the record and
had found only one such reference. Id. The trial court, after excusing the jury,
chastised the student’s mother and instructed the plaintiffs and their counsel
that the court would not allow any further reference to specific hazing
incidents at other universities. Id.
193. Id. The trial court did not give a limiting instruction to the jury, and
the national fraternity’s attorney did not object. Id. The jury-imposed liability
upon the national fraternity even without evidence of other incidents. Id. On
this issue, the national fraternity appealed urging that they were entitled to
de novo review by the court on appeal because the plaintiffs inflamed the jury
by repeated reference to hazing incidents at other universities—evidence that
was specifically excluded by the trial court. Id.
194. Id.
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because most states model their rules of procedure on the
federal rules.195
1.

Interrogatories

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(a)(1)–(2),
“Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a party
may serve on any other party no more than 25 written
interrogatories, including all discrete subparts. . . . An
interrogatory may relate to any matter that may be inquired
into under Rule 26(b).”196 Rule 26(b)(1) states,
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of
discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the
case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the
action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access
to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and
whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of
discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be
discoverable.197

In the context of hazing litigation, interrogatories should
focus on the following questions:
(1) Who at the national level is responsible for providing
information and training to fraternity/sorority members
around risk management and hazing?
(2) Do those individuals report to the national board?
(3) How often are reports relative to training and sanctions
made to the membership?

195. See Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, Braking the Rules: Why
State Courts Should Not Replicate Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 67 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 501, 536 exhibit A (2016) (illustrating the
relative influence of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on
several states’ rules of civil procedure).
196. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a)(1)–(2).
197. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
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(4) What qualifies nationally elected leadership to train
subordinates who train others?
(5) How does nationally elected leadership decide who plays
a crucial role in addressing hazing?
(6) How many chapters in the fraternity/sorority have been
sanctioned for hazing since [state year]?
(7) What amount of fraternity/sorority funds is directed
toward addressing hazing and risk management each year?

2.

Requests for Production of Documents

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a)(1)(A)–(B),
A party may serve on any other party a request within the
scope of Rule 26(b): (1) to produce and permit the requesting
party or its representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample
the following items in the responding party’s possession,
custody, or control: (A) any designated documents or
electronically stored information—including writings,
drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings,
images, and other data or data compilations—stored in any
medium from which information can be obtained either
directly or, if necessary, after translation by the responding
party into a reasonably usable form; (B) or any designated
tangible things.198

Here, the primary things plaintiff’s counsel will look for are
(1) reports on hazing incidents within the organization dating
back some years, (2) the various iterations of the new
membership process, (3) records of chapter sanctions for hazing,
(4) emails and other correspondences from and to national, and
other, leadership concerning the hazing incident at issue and
broader communications over time about how to address the
issue, and (5) the organization’s current risk management
approach. The last of these raises the specter of the extent to
which the organization uses effective teaching and learning
methods as well as the best available practices, research, and
data.

198.

FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A)(B).
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3.

Depositions

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(1), “A
party may, by oral questions, depose any person, including a
party, without leave of court.”199 Plaintiff’s counsel will want to
depose living victims, other “pledges,” and members of the
chapter to see who played an active role in the hazing. The
chapter advisor(s) and relevant members of the advising alumni
chapter/alumni association are also likely to be deposed. The
goal will be to see who played a direct role in the hazing or who
had constructive knowledge of the conduct. That could help tie
the hazing incident to the national organization through those
playing a supervisory role. Individuals who play an integral role
in organizational risk management around hazing are also
likely to be deposed to see if they were competent in their
responsibilities. Lack of competence through said staff, and even
volunteers, arguably ties the national organization to the hazing
incident more strongly. In addition, members of the
organization’s leadership structure—e.g., area-level, state-level,
and regional-level heads—help connect the national
organization to the hazing incidents through actual or
constructive knowledge. They may also do so, especially if they
sit on the organization’s national board, through their decisions
concerning whether and how to address hazing, as well as who
they bring to the table to aid in problem-solving.200 Depending
on the organization, either the Executive Director or National
Head would be an ideal deponent to provide plaintiffs’ attorneys
a sense of how the organization has tried to combat hazing. For
example, in BGLOs, the National Heads are like benevolent
dictators—governing in a quasi-authoritarian fashion,
exercising disproportionate political power within their
organization, doing so, in many ways, “for the benefit of the
Accordingly,
their
membership
and
organization.”201
decision-making and their rise to influence and power in their
organization warrant query. Consider the following questions
and their rationale:
199. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(1).
200. See Parks & Mutisya, supra note 4, at 63–97 (discussing leadership
positions in fraternities).
201. Id. at 43.
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Q: How long have you been in leadership in your
fraternity/sorority? [The goal is to ascertain, somewhat
indirectly, how much experience they have had grappling
with hazing in their organization.]
Q: What leadership positions have you had in your
fraternity/sorority? [The goal is to have them demonstrate
that they have been in the system for quite some time and
grappled with hazing at different levels, which may have
called for different levels of authority and resources in
combating the problem.]
Q: When did you first know your fraternity/sorority had a
hazing issue? [The goal is to see if they will be honest about
knowing that hazing has been a substantial issue in their
organization. If they suggest that they do not, does their
assessment correlate with the data on hazing complaints
within the organization and history of hazing litigation
therein.]
Q: When you ran for National Head did you have a platform
plank on addressing hazing? [The goal is to show that either
they have not demonstrated a commitment to addressing the
issue or that their approach is naïve or lackluster. It would
be wise to ask for campaign literature.]
Q: As National Head, what has been your strategy to address
hazing? [The goal is to ascertain their depth of
understanding of the issue and whether they have been
willing to push the envelope on addressing the issue.]
Q: Do you know [name members of their fraternity/sorority
who are noted experts on hazing] and have you ever invited
them to the table? [The goal is to determine the extent to
which he/she was willing to utilize internal expertise to solve
problems.]

E.

Expert Witnesses

Hazing experts can be employed to help litigators make
sense of (1) what hazing is, (2) the research on what drives it,
(3) the research on the best available solutions, and (4)
specialized knowledge of how certain types of organizations
operate considering the issue. Parties often rely on experts in
both civil and criminal litigation to present their well-informed
opinions with respect to a particular issue in a case. The issue
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aligns with that expert’s specialized knowledge about which the
average person, with no particular training or understanding,
cannot form accurate opinions or come to informed
conclusions.202 “An expert is one who has made the subject upon
which he or she gives his or her opinion a matter of particular
study, practice, or observation.”203 Most experts are regularly
engaged in the practice of a profession, hold professional degrees
from a university or college, and have had special professional
training and experience regarding the subject on which their
testimony is based.204 Their purpose in a case “is to provide an
opinion about a disputed issue”205 to assist the judge or jury with
information to determine a fact in issue requiring specialized
knowledge not ordinarily known to the trier of fact.206
1.

Legal Standard for Expert Testimony

Before an expert can give their opinion, they must be vetted
by the court and must satisfy criteria set forth in the relevant
rules of evidence of the jurisdiction in which they are asked to
testify.207 If these criteria are not met, the court has the
discretion to disqualify the expert witness and refuse admission
of their testimony.208 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of
an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and

202. See 31A AM. JUR. 2D Expert and Opinion Evidence § 1 (2021) (citing
Spears v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 161 So. 351 (La. Ct. App. 1935)).
203. Id. (citing Pridgen v. Gibson, 139 S.E. 443 (N.C. 1927)).
204. Id. (citing Prohaska v. Bison Co., Inc., 365 So. 2d 794 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978); Haymore v. Thew Shovel Co., 446 S.E.2d 865 (N.C. App. 1994)).
205. Id. (citing Rothstein v. Orange Grove Ctr., Inc., 60 S.W.3d 807 (Tenn.
2001)).
206. See id. (citing Ficic v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 804 N.Y.S.2d 541
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005)).
207. See id. (citing Crist v. Loyacono, 65 So. 3d 837 (Miss. 2011)).
208. See id. § 41.
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methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the
principles and methods to the facts of the case.209

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,210 the
United States Supreme Court interpreted Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 and considered the admissibility of scientific
expert testimony, stating that this testimony is admissible only
if it is both relevant and reliable.211 Daubert also held that the
Federal Rules of Evidence “assign to the trial judge the task of
ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable
foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.”212 In looking to
particular factors, the Court also addressed such specifics as
testing, peer review, error rates, and degree of acceptance in the
relevant scientific community, some or all of which might prove
helpful in determining the reliability of a particular scientific
“theory or technique.”213
In Motorola, Inc. v. Murray,214 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals sought to make sense of Daubert.215 The court
noted that “when a party proffers expert scientific testimony,
the trial court must make ‘a preliminary assessment of whether
the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.’”216
While the Daubert Court rejected the notion of “a definitive
checklist or test,” it “suggest[ed] factors to be considered,
including whether the theory or technique ha[d] been tested,
whether it ‘ha[d] been subjected to peer review and publication,’
‘the known or potential rate of error,’ and ‘the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s

209. FED. R. EVID. 702.
210. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
211. See id. at 588–89.
212. Id. at 597.
213. Id. at 593–94.
214. 147 A.3d 751 (D.C. 2016).
215. See id. at 754–56 (“[T]he impact of the Daubert trilogy has been
mixed: These cases relax the initial barriers to the admission of expert
testimony, but at the same time emphasize the trial judge’s robust gatekeeping
function.”).
216. Id. at 754 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 59293).
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operation.’”217 Moreover, “[t]he focus . . . must be solely on
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they
generate.”218 In its Motorola opinion, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals went on to state that the Daubert Court
underscored the trial judge’s gatekeeping function:
“General acceptance” is not a necessary precondition to the
admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, but the Rules of Evidence—especially Rule
702—do assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an
expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is
relevant to the task at hand. Pertinent evidence based on
scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands.219

The Supreme Court extended the Daubert standard to all
experts—not just scientific experts. In Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael,220 it also reaffirmed that the judge’s gatekeeping
role “is to make certain that an expert, whether basing
testimony upon professional studies or personal experience,
employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor
that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant
field.”221 The Court added that a trial court may consider any of
the factors that Daubert mentioned to help determine the
testimony’s reliability.222 However, as articulated in Daubert,
the reliability test is “flexible,” and Daubert’s list of specific
factors “neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts
or in every case.”223
2.

Disqualification of an Expert Witness

Judges may also disqualify proposed expert witnesses on
other grounds, namely for having conflicts of interest.224 There
217. Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 59394).
218. Id. (omission in original) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595).
219. Id. at 755 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597).
220. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
221. Id. at 152.
222. See id. at 141.
223. Id.
224. See Nina A. Vershuta, Note, New Rules of War in the Battle of the
Experts: Amending the Expert Witness Disqualification Test for Conflicts of
Interest, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 733, 741 (2016).
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is limited judicial precedent, no Supreme Court precedent, no
rule in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or any other statute,
and no ethical guidance for this disqualification.225 Though the
law varies by jurisdiction, judges typically rely on their inherent
judicial authority to remove expert witnesses if they deem them
to be unqualified.226 Though disqualification of experts is
generally rare,227 courts traditionally employ a two-part test to
disqualify an expert witness.228 The test applies when, “(1)
opposing clients retain the same expert to testify in separate
cases against each another [sic]; or (2) one party retains an
expert formerly retained by the adverse party to testify in the
same case.”229 The two elements of this test are: “First, was it
objectively reasonable for the first party who retained the expert
to believe that a confidential relationship existed, [and s]econd,
did that party disclose any confidential information to the
expert?”230 Some courts have added a third element to the test,
which aims to balance the policy objectives of dismissing expert
witnesses.231
The seminal case for the traditional test for disqualification
is Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co.232 This is a
product-liability case in which a baseball helmet failed to protect
a player who consequently suffered brain damage.233 One of the
lawyers met with an expert witness for an hour, and the other
225. See Kendall Coffey, Inherent Judicial Authority and the Expert
Disqualification Doctrine, 56 FLA. L. REV. 195, 204 (2004).
226. See Vershuta, supra note 224, at 754 (stating that federal and state
courts’ inherent authority to disqualify experts and attorneys “derives from
the court’s ‘judicial duty to protect the integrity of the legal process’
and . . . ‘preserve[s] the public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the
judicial proce[ss]’” (citing Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271,
278 (S.D. Ohio 1988))).
227. See id. at 734.
228. See id. at 740.
229. Id. (emphasis added).
230. Douglas R. Richmond, Expert Witness Conflicts and Compensation, 67
TENN. L. REV. 909, 913 (2000) (citing Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 156
F.R.D. 575, 580 (D.N.J. 1994)).
231. See Coffey, supra note 225, at 209 (citing Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams
Co., 156 F.R.D. 575, 580 (D.N.J. 1994)).
232. 123 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
233. See id. at 273.
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side retained the witness seven months later.234 The magistrate
judge set out a two-pronged analysis, which is now generally
accepted across the nation.235 Under the two-element test, each
inquiry requires its own independent answer. The burden of
proof is on the party seeking the expert’s disqualification.236 In
fact, there is a heightened burden, since courts have stated that
“the movant cannot meet its burden with ‘mere conclusory or
ipse dixit assertions.’”237
There is a lack of consensus among jurisdictions as to what
satisfies the first element of the test. Some courts require a
specific contractual relationship, such as the signing of a
nondisclosure agreement.238 Generally, this issue arises when
an expert was employed by a party in an unrelated matter and
is then poised to testify against his former client.239 Outside of
the states that strictly require a contract, courts will generally
follow a multi-factor test to determine if there was a confidential
relationship. These factors vary by jurisdiction, but the more
popular factors are:
(1) whether the client and expert had a long-standing
relationship, (2) whether the client and expert engaged in
frequent contacts, (3) whether the client intended to or has
called the expert as a witness at trial, (4) whether an actual
exchange of attorney work product occurred, (5) “whether the
expert was paid a fee,” (6) “whether the expert was asked not
to discuss the case with the opposing parties or counsel,” and

234. See Coffey, supra note 225, at 203.
235. See Vershuta, supra note 224, at 741 (“[B]oth federal and state courts
have accepted [the Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co. test] as the governing
test to resolve conflicts of interest in the expert witness context.”).
236. See id.
237. Id. at 742 (quoting Greene, Tweed of Del., Inc. v. DuPont Dow
Elastomers, L.L.C., 202 F.R.D. 426, 429 (E.D. Pa. 2001)).
238. See id. at 743 (“Some judges will not inquire beyond the existence of
a confidentiality agreement, while others explicitly reject this limited
inquiry.”).
239. See Winzelberg v. 1319 50th St. Realty Corp., 940 N.Y.S.2d 854,
856– 57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012), aff’d, 979 N.Y.S.2d 655 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)
(highlighting that defendants failed to disqualify plaintiff’s expert witness
because no confidential relationship existed between the expert and any
defendants in the action, and no other basis for finding a conflict of interest
was presented).
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(7) “whether the expert derived any of his specific ideas from
work done under the direction of the retaining party.”240

Which factors, if any, a court uses varies by jurisdiction. It
is widely accepted that the client did not actually have to retain
the expert for a confidential relationship to exist.241
The second prong of the test is that disqualification of an
expert witness is appropriate if there was disclosure of
confidential information.242 There are two main areas of
disagreement between courts on this prong. First, courts
disagree on the definition of “confidential information,” and
second, courts disagree about whether the information disclosed
to the expert in past litigation must relate to the current case.243
The most common definition for confidential information is
“information ‘of either particular significance or . . . which can
be readily identified as either attorney work product or within
the scope of the attorney-client privilege.’”244 There are also less
strict standards. For instance, in Chrisjulbrian Co. v. Upper St.
Rose Fleeting Co.,245 the Eastern District of Louisiana found that
only information that would not be subject to discovery could
constitute confidential information.246 Finally, like the first
prong, there are several factors that courts may consider in
determining whether privileged information was shared. Courts
will generally find that privileged information was shared if the
client and expert witness discussed:
(1) litigation strategy or a theory of the case, (2) the moving
party’s views on each side’s strengths and weaknesses, (3)
the types of witnesses the moving party expects to retain and

240. See Vershuta, supra note 224, at 744 (footnotes omitted).
241. See id. at 745 (“[T]he only question is whether a confidential
client-expert relationship existed . . . .”).
242. Id. at 746.
243. See id.
244. Id. at 747 (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. EMC Corp., 330 F. Supp.
2d 1087, 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2004)).
245. No. 93-1879, 1994 WL 673440 (E.D. La. Dec. 2, 1994).
246. See id. at *2 (finding that the parties could not have an “‘objectively
reasonable’ belief in a ‘confidential’ relationship” because the expert’s
testimony in other litigation was discoverable).
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the roles of such witnesses, (4) approach to discovery, (5)
potential defenses, and (6) counsel’s mental impressions.247

There is also a split among jurisdictions as to whether the
information shared in previous litigation must relate to the
subject matter of the current litigation.248 The majority view is
that the only requirement is some exchange of privileged
information, but there is a minority view in some jurisdictions
that the information must relate to the current subject
matter.249
The court in Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams Co.250 added a third
element to the Rawlings Sporting Goods Co. test. The Cordy
court wanted to “balance the competing policy objectives in
determining expert [witness] disqualification.”251 It considered
several factors to determine whether the expert witness should
be disqualified including: “the need to ensure that litigants ha[d]
access to expert witnesses and their specialized knowledge, the
right of experts to pursue their professional calling, and” the
worry that, if experts were easily dismissed, litigants might
create relationships with many experts to prevent their
opponents from enlisting their services.252 This third element
has been accepted by multiple courts.253 However, each court
chooses or creates its own factors for evaluation. Notably, the
Fifth Circuit, in Koch Refining Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux,
MV,254 endorsed both the Rawlings Sporting Goods Co. test and
the third element.255 Their factors included: (1) making sure
there was access to expert witnesses, (2) making sure it was
hard to dismiss experts, and (3) the availability and accessibility
of other expert witnesses.256

247. Vershuta, supra note 224, at 747–48.
248. See id. at 749.
249. See id. at 749–50.
250. 156 F.R.D. 575 (D.N.J. 1994).
251. Id. at 580.
252. Coffey, supra note 225, at 209.
253. See id. at 210–11.
254. 85 F.3d 1178 (5th Cir. 1996).
255. See id. at 1181–83 (considering the two-part confidential relationship
test and evaluating whether all parties had access to hiring expert witnesses).
256. See id. at 1183 (consolidating these factors from lower court opinions).
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Expert Testimony in the Context of Hazing Litigation

In Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity,257 the plaintiffs
put forward the expert testimony of Diane Ruth Follingstad, a
clinical psychologist and associate professor of psychology, who
testified to whether the pledge was psychologically manipulated
into drinking excessive amounts of alcohol.258 Follingstad
testified about what psychological literature suggests about
group dynamics.259 The fraternity challenged her testimony as
(1) being irrelevant, (2) relating to matters about which expert
testimony was not required, (3) being offered without proper
foundation, and (4) constituting hearsay.260 The court responded
to each of the fraternity’s arguments in turn. First, the court
stated that Follingstad’s testimony was offered by the plaintiff
to assist the jury in determining whether Ballou was
psychologically manipulated into consuming alcohol.261 On that
basis, the court concluded that it was relevant.262 Second, the
court did not agree with the fraternity that Follingstad’s
testimony would have been within the jury’s common knowledge
or experience and that it was inadmissible on those grounds.263
The court thought the role that group dynamics play on human
behavior was a proper subject of expert testimony.264 Third, the
court rejected the fraternity’s contention that the trial judge
allowed the expert to testify about matters lacking an
appropriate foundation and, therefore, lacking merit.265 Fourth,
regarding the hearsay objection, the court found that
Follingstad “did not testify to an opinion.”266 Rather, she gave
expert testimony in the form of an explanation of applicable

257. 352 S.E.2d 488 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986).
258. See id. at 496–97.
259. See id. at 497 (noting that her testimony was not based on opinion).
260. Id. at 496.
261. See id. at 497.
262. Id.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See id. (holding that a factual foundation is not required for testimony
in an expert’s unique knowledge of experience and study).
266. Id.
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psychological principles that she gleaned from well-qualified
research and study.267
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Inc.,268 Santana
Kenner brought a negligence action against the fraternity.269 He
alleged that fraternity members psychologically and physically
hazed him, resulting in renal failure and other medical issues.270
As context, he indicated that in 1994, a Kappa Alpha Psi pledge
died from hazing. In response, Kappa issued “Executive Order
Number Three” that sanctioned hazing perpetrators. Further,
Kappa instituted a national moratorium on its membership
intake process. During the moratorium, Kappa contemplated
new policies and procedures to prevent hazing when it lifted the
moratorium.271 In bringing a negligence action, to support his
argument on the element of breach, Kenner relied on Dr.
Catherine C. Scroggs’s expert report, in which she opined that
Kappa breached its duty because “[Kappa’s] brief two-year
moratorium seemed to be a symbolic gesture rather than an
action with any substance if its goal was to eliminate hazing.”272
In her opinion,
When we remove a chapter from campus for hazing, we
remove them for at least four years, and when the chapter
returns we prohibit members who were involved during the
violation from affiliating with the chapter. There was no
effort by Kappa Alpha Psi to rid its chapter ranks of those

267. See id.
268. 808 A.2d 178 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
269. Id. at 181.
270. See id. at 180.
271. Id. at 179.
272. Id. at 183 (quoting Letter from Dr. Scroggs 4 (Mar. 19, 2001)). Dr.
Scroggs might have considered the extent to which the fraternity employed
content-matter experts to reconceptualize how it addressed hazing. See Parks
& Mutisya, supra note 4, at 85–97. She might also have considered what
informed the extent to which Kappa revised: (1) its process, see Gregory S.
Parks, Pledge to End Hazing, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 111, 111–12
(2021); and (2) how it approached sanctions, Gregory S. Parks, The Failure of
Zero-Tolerance Policies in Addressing Hazing, 126 PENN STATE L. REV. PENN
STATIM 1, 7–8 (2021).
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undergraduates who believed the only way to be a ‘real
Kappa’ was to endure physical abuse.273

However, the court did not find such testimony sufficient,
because Scroggs failed “to refer to facts, testimony or empirical
data supporting her opinion.”274 According to the court, absent
such facts, “Kenner failed to make out a prima facie case of
negligence to overcome Kappa’s summary judgment motion.”275
Kenner alleged that when he sought membership in Kappa
in 1996, chapter members held an introductory meeting for
prospective members. The chapter advisor, Kevin Clark, was in
attendance. During two subsequent meetings, chapter members
psychologically and physically hazed Kenner and other initiates.
At one of these meetings, Kenner was paddled over two hundred
times on his buttocks. Neither Clark nor Eric Morris, then
Kappa’s East Central Province President, attended the
meetings where the hazing took place.276 As to Kenner’s claims
about chapter advisor Clark, however, the court found that
Kenner detailed Clark’s conduct.277 Clark indicated to Beta
Epsilon members that an “interest meeting” was permissible
despite knowing that it was prohibited by the moratorium.278
The court further observed that Clark offered the
prospective members little insight at the interest meeting
vis-à-vis hazing, despite feeling required to do so.279 Kenner’s
expert, Scroggs, “point[ed] out that Clark did not understand the
new membership intake process and did not take steps to find
out what activity had occurred after an informational meeting

273. Brief of Appellant Santana Kenner at 8, Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi
Fraternity, Inc., 808 A.2d 178 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (No. GD 98-4464), 2001
WL 34735240.
274. Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Inc., 808 A.2d 178, 179 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2002).
275. Id. at 184; see Checchio ex rel. Checchio v. Frankford Hosp.-Torresdale
Div., 717 A.2d 1058, 1062 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (concluding that expert
testimony was too unreliable to send to the jury because the expert offered
subjective opinion without reference to medical literature or the expert’s
research).
276. Kenner, 808 A.2d at 180.
277. Id.
278. Id. (quoting Clark Dep. 71).
279. Id.
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he conducted.”280 She opined that “Clark should have told
initiates the next steps of the initiation process as a means of
monitoring the membership intake process,” and that “had
Clark been more engaged in the membership process, Kenner
would not have sustained his injuries.”281 In reviewing the
sufficiency of Scroggs’s testimony pertaining to Clark, the court
noted that “Clark’s testimony [was] the only factual material
upon which Scroggs base[d] her opinion that a duty had been
breached.”282 Finding this sufficient, the court determined that
Kenner had established a prima facie case only of Clark’s
negligence.283
Another common objection to the admission of expert
testimony in the context of hazing litigation has been that an
expert testifies to “the ultimate issue.”284 In other words, the
expert testifies to an opinion that makes a direct conclusion as
to the legal elements at issue in a given claim. One case that has
dealt with such objections is Commonwealth v. Pi Delta Psi,
Inc.285 In that case, the court held that “[a]n opinion is not
excludable merely because it embraces an ultimate issue.”286
Despite this language, the trial court disallowed the
organization’s expert witness who would have opined that the
corporation’s anti-hazing policy and training met Greek Life’s
national standard of care.287 Specifically, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court noted that an expert opinion that embraces an
ultimate issue may be objectionable on other grounds—for
example, “depending on the helpfulness of the testimony versus
its potential to cause confusion or prejudice.”288 The court came
to this decision because the prosecution’s theory as to the
corporation’s guilt rested entirely on its vicarious liability for its
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Commonwealth v. Pi Delta Psi, Inc., 211 A.3d 875, 883 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2019).
285. 211 A.3d 875 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019).
286. Id. at 882.
287. See id.
288. Id. (quoting McManamon v. Washko, 906 A.2d 1259, 1278–79 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2006)).

FRATERNITY AND SORORITY HAZING

381

agents’ misconduct.289 The court emphasized that the
corporation’s standard of care was irrelevant, and the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert’s opinion on
the standard of care.290
As a final example, in Morrison v. Kappa Alpha Psi
Fraternity, Kendrick Morrison, a freshman interested in
membership in Kappa Alpha Psi, was physically beaten by the
president of the fraternity chapter during a gathering that took
place in a dorm room.291 That same night, Kendrick received
treatment at the Lincoln General Hospital for injuries to his
head and neck and reported the incident to campus police.292
After filing suit against Kappa Alpha Psi and others, Kendrick
and his parents testified that he had a lifelong desire to become
a physical therapist.293 Dr. Paul Ware, Kendrick’s treating
psychiatrist, testified that as a result of the hazing Kendrick’s
grades dropped below the point required for admission to a
physical therapy program.294 In addition to Dr. Ware’s
testimony, plaintiffs presented the expert testimony of
Stephanie Chalfin, a vocational rehabilitation expert, as to the
amount of future income that Kendrick could have earned as a
physical therapist.295
The State retained Dr. Richard Galloway as its vocational
rehabilitation expert and to review Kendrick’s medical records
and the depositions of Dr. Ware, Dr. Harju, and Ms. Chalfin.296
Plaintiffs resisted the State’s efforts to provide Dr. Galloway
with Kendrick’s grade transcript even though Ms. Chalfin had a

289. See id. at 882 (noting that, under the vicarious liability doctrine, the
corporation is liable when local and national officers commit crimes in causing
the death of an associate member).
290. See id. at 883 (emphasizing that the testimony discussing that the
corporation met the national standard was of no relevance to the corporation’s
criminal culpability).
291. Morrison v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, 31805, p. 1 (La. App. 2 Cir.
9/24/99); 738 So. 2d 1105, 1110.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1111.
294. See id.
295. See id. (noting that Stephanie Chalfin testified after reviewing
plaintiffs school transcripts).
296. See id.
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copy of the transcript.297 The trial court ordered production of
the transcript.298 After reviewing the transcripts, Dr. Galloway
opined that it was more probable than not that Kendrick would
have been unable to gain admission to physical therapy school
because his grades even before the hazing incident were
inadequate.299 In fact, Dr. Galloway noted that Kendrick’s
grades appeared to improve after the hazing incident.300 Dr.
Galloway noted that Dr. Ware, who had a different opinion,
failed to take into account Kendrick’s actual scholastic
performance.301
On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the trial court
erred in allowing Dr. Galloway to testify on the issue of
Kendrick’s loss of earning capacity.302 According to the
plaintiffs, Dr. Galloway should have been precluded from
changing his opinion on the eve of trial in a manner that
prejudiced plaintiffs vis-à-vis his review of Kendrick’s grade
transcript from Louisiana Tech.303 The court of appeals
ultimately agreed with the trial court, finding that Dr. Galloway
could testify as the State’s vocational rehabilitation expert on
the issue of the student’s loss of earning capacity due to injuries
allegedly sustained during fraternity hazing, even though the
expert changed his opinion on the eve of trial.304 In its reasoning,
the court of appeals noted that the student and his parents
resisted the State’s efforts to provide the State’s expert with the
student’s college transcript, even though their own expert had a
copy of the transcript, and concluded that any delay in
transcript production or change in the expert’s opinion after his
review was caused by the student and his parents.305
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. See id. (explaining that Dr. Galloway noted that Kendrick’s science
and math grades were poor throughout his college career).
300. See id. (concluding that at most, the hazing incident delayed Kendrick
from obtaining his undergraduate degree).
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1110.
303. See id. at 1110–11 (arguing that the last-minute change in Dr.
Galloway’s testimony was untimely, unfair, and prejudicial).
304. See id. at 1111–12.
305. Id.
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IV. DAMAGES
This Part investigates the damages regime in hazing
litigation as well as how courts navigate issues concerning
collection.
A.

General Damages

General damages involve “mental or physical pain or
suffering, inconvenience, the loss of intellectual gratification or
physical enjoyment, or other losses of life or life-style that
cannot be definitively measured in monetary terms.”306 The
amount of general damages awarded to plaintiffs varies
significantly from case to case.307 Many states have statutory
caps on damage amounts, which may make a tort claim less
attractive to some plaintiffs.308 While statutory caps do not
affect the recovery of damages from private universities, the
laws reduce the amount of relief possible from state colleges.309
In Morrison v. Kappa Alpha Psi, the plaintiffs brought suit
against the fraternity’s national organization, its insurer, its
president, and the state for damages resulting from hazing
activities.310 The trial court noted that general damages do not
have a common denominator but are decided on a case-by-case
basis.311 The student had claimed that he sustained mental and
emotional injuries as a result of the hazing and urged the jury
306. Kessler v. Southmark Corp., 25941, p. 8 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/21/94); 643
So. 2d 345, 351; see Killough v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 28329, p. 12 (La. App.
Cir. 5/8/96); 674 So. 2d 1091, 1100 (defining general damages as those “which
may not be fixed with pecuniary exactitude”).
307. See 6 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 679 (2021) (providing a
non-exhaustive list of factors that may affect the amount of general damages
awarded to a plaintiff in a given case).
308. See Susan S. Bendlin, Cocktails on Campus: Are Libations a
Liability?, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 96–97 (2015) (“At least thirty-three states
have statutory limits on the amount of compensatory damages that the state
can pay.”).
309. See id. at 97 (noting that many “states have statutorily barred some
types of tort actions against state entities” in addition to “various immunity
doctrines” which “shield universities and their administrators from suit”).
310. Morrison v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, 31805, p. 1 (La. App. 2d Cir.
5/7/99); 738 So. 2d 1105, 1110.
311. See id. at 1121.
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to award $100,000 in general damages.312 The trial court
awarded damages to the student in accordance with the
$300,000 jury verdict—three times the amount the plaintiffs’
attorney had asked for.313 On appeal, the court had to determine
what the highest amount reasonably within the jury’s discretion
was, ultimately concluding that $40,000 was the highest
amount the jury could have reasonably awarded Kendrick for
injuries that were primarily psychological and that had largely
been resolved during trial.314 Accordingly, the court of appeals
found the jury’s award of $300,000 to be “grossly excessive and
tantamount to an imposition of punitive damages.”315
B.

Actual Damages

Actual, or “special,” damages provide compensation for the
reasonably foreseeable consequences of a defendant’s actions
that are pecuniary in nature.316 Actual damages recoverable by
or on behalf of an injured person may include compensation for
necessary and reasonable medical expenses (actual past
expenses for physician, hospital, nursing, and laboratory fees;
medicines; prosthetic devices; etc.) as well as anticipated future
medical expenses.317 Additionally, actual damages can cover loss
of past and future earnings, such as actual loss of wages or
salary, loss of existing vocational skill, or loss of capacity to earn
increased wages.318
In addition to the award of general damages in Morrison,
the court assessed the propriety of awarding actual damages to
the student.319 To start, the court of appeals stated that

312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. See Jensen v. Matute, 2019-0706, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/29/20); 289
So. 3d 1136, 1142 (defining special damages as those with a calculable market
value “such that the amount theoretically may be determined with relative
certainty”).
317. See 6 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 679 (2021).
318. Id.
319. See Morrison, 738 So. 2d at 1121 (declining to second-guess the jury’s
decision on an award for future medical expenses).
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[i]n assessing damages in cases of offenses, quasi-offenses
and quasi-contracts, much discretion is left to the trier of
fact. It is only when the award is, in either direction, beyond
that which a reasonable trier of fact could assess for the
effects of the particular injury to the particular plaintiff
under the particular circumstances that the appellate court
should increase or reduce the award.320

The court noted that “[a]n award for future medical
expenses is proper if the plaintiff is able to establish through
medical testimony the necessity for such expenses . . . . It must
be demonstrated that such outlays more probably than not will
be incurred.”321 The evidence before the court established that
as a result of the hazing incident, the student suffered bodily
injuries consisting of contusions to the neck, headaches, and a
cervical strain.322 At most, the court noted, he was treated for
fourteen months for his physical injuries.323 An additional
amount of actual damages was considered based on the
testimony of the student’s psychiatrist about the student’s
continued treatments and medications relating to the student’s
psychological injuries resulting from a hazing incident.324 At the
end of the case, the judge awarded damages in accordance with
the jury’s $6,000 award for the student’s future medical
expenses, but denied the parents’ recovery for loss of
consortium.325
C.

Propriety of Punitive Damages

An award of punitive damages can typically only be
awarded as a result of intentional, fraudulent, malicious, or
reckless acts, or acts committed with willful and wanton

320. Id.
321. Id. at 1122.
322. Id. at 1121.
323. Id.
324. See id. at 1122 (stating that plaintiff would have permanent and
residual fear because of the hazing incident).
325. See id. (finding that “[m]ental anguish suffered by the parents
because of an injury to their child is not compensable in a loss of consortium
claim”).
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disregard for the consequences.326 This elevated intent standard
is justified in the context of punitive damages because punitive
damages are not compensation for harms a plaintiff faced, but
rather function to punish the defendant and deter similar
behavior of that defendant and others similarly situated in the
future.327 Though not a matter of right, even where the case’s
facts appear to render a punitive damages award appropriate,
punitive damages are proper in any tort action that involves
insult, fraud, or malice.328
In Alexander v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Inc.,329 a
fraternity member brought a negligence claim and other tort
claims against a fraternity and others.330 The suit arose from a
hazing incident that occurred as a part of “underground
pledging,” which was strictly forbidden by the fraternity.331 The
plaintiff argued that the national organization “acted with
reckless disregard for the rights of the plaintiff when they
refused to investigate [the perpetrator of the acts against
Alexander] . . . and decided to initiate him into the Kappa Alpha
Psi Fraternity in direct contravention of its policies.”332 The
court stated that a person acts recklessly when he “is aware of,
but consciously disregards, a substantial and unjustifiable risk
of such a nature that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would
exercise under all the circumstances.”333 The court determined
that the fraternity attempted to investigate whether
underground pledging was occurring, but the investigation was
conducted by a fraternity member with no experience in such

326. See 6 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 679 § 11 (2021).
327. See id. (noting that there is a compelling state interest in punishing
and deterring such conduct).
328. See id.
329. 464 F. Supp. 2d 751 (M.D. Tenn. 2006).
330. Id. at 754.
331. See id.
332. Id. at 757–58.
333. Id. at 758 (quoting Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901
(Tenn. 1992)).
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matters.334 The court thus stated that the defendants, at worst,
delegated the investigation of alleged underground pledging to
an untrained alumnus and initiated someone into the fraternity
who had been identified as an underground pledging initiate.335
In the court’s view, these actions did not reveal the national
headquarters’ reckless disregard of the risk of hazing.336 Thus,
the court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
the issue of punitive damages, finding no genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the actions of the national
organization qualified as a gross deviation from the standard of
care that an ordinary person would exercise in such
circumstances.337
Similarly, the court in Furek v. University of Delaware338
held that a university’s conduct did not rise to a level that would
have supported an award of punitive damages.339 The pledge’s
suit against the university (and others) arose out of a fraternity
hazing incident in which he was burned when lye-based liquid
oven cleaner was poured over his body.340 The trial court had
previously directed a verdict in favor of all defendants on the
claim for punitive damages.341 The court of appeals agreed.342 It
reasoned that the university was on notice of hazing activities

334. See id. at 756–57 (finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that
the fraternity breached its duty to prevent hazing-related activities because
the fraternity failed to adequately conduct an investigation).
335. See id. at 758.
336. Id.
337. See id. (reasoning that although the steps taken by the fraternity may
have been ineffectual, no genuine issue of material fact existed).
338. 594 A.2d 506 (Del. 1991).
339. See id. at 523.
340. See id. at 510.
341. Id. at 512. The court stated that a jury could find that the university
was aware of dangers associated with hazing on account of a prior incident. Id.
at 515. It noted that the university did issue a memo banning such activities
after the incident. Id. But it also observed that their evidence in the record
indicated that the university knew fraternities were still hazing at the time of
the pledge’s incident and prior thereto. Id. The court pointed out that there
was no evidence of a concerted effort by the university, using the resources
available to it, to abolish this activity completely or to effectively monitor the
nature of the continued hazing. Id. at 520.
342. See id. at 523.
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on its campus in the years preceding the pledge’s injuries.343
However, the university’s response was well-intentioned and
not characterized by a conscious disregard of a known
risk—notwithstanding that a jury could have deemed the
university’s response ineffectual.344 The court of appeals
concluded that a directed verdict in favor of the defendants on
the issue of punitive damages was proper.345
D.

Problems with Collection of Judgment

Insurance plays a significant role in fraternity and sorority
hazing litigation.346 Sometimes, national organizations use
organization assets to satisfy a judgment.347 For example, many
fraternity and sorority national organizations have some degree
of self-insured retention (SIR), which they use to resolve claims
up to their retention limits as determined by the size and loss
experience of the national organization.348 Fraternities and
sororities with sound risk management programs can
self-insure up to a certain limit—after which catastrophic
coverage takes effect—using money saved from paying lower
premiums.349 This presents a challenge as plaintiffs struggle to
collect judgments while facing the potential shifting of assets
that occurs when an organization moves assets to an alter ego
of the organization to avoid paying the judgment.
In Blackston v. Omega Psi Phi,350 University of Louisville
Omega Psi Phi Fraternity members hazed Shawn Blackston.351

343. Id.
344. See id.
345. Id.
346. See generally Kimzey, supra note 17.
347. See id. at 468 (detailing the use of SIR funds by fraternities and
sororities).
348. See id. at 468–69 (noting that the organizations use SIR funds to
investigate, defend, and settle claims).
349. See id. at 469.
350. No. 97 CI 3463, 1999 KY Trial Ct. Rev. LEXIS 628 (Ky. Cir. Ct. July
30, 1999), https://perma.cc/8HLP-FDYX.
351. See Student Possibly Paddled in U of L Fraternity Hazing, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER Apr. 11, 1997, at B3, https://perma.cc/C4L8-L7TZ (PDF)
(reporting that Shawn Blackston, a University of Louisville freshman, was
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Blackston alleged that Omega knew or should have known that
the Louisville chapter was hazing—given the awareness of
Omega’s regional trainer—and sued Omega for $500,000 in
punitive damages.352 The jury found that Omega was negligent
but that Blackston was comparatively at fault (5 percent).353 The
jury awarded Blackston $931,428, which included $750,000 in
punitive damages.354 In an effort to collect, Blackston conducted
a title search in Georgia, where Omega’s world headquarters
were located.355 The search revealed that Emerson Carey,
Jr.—Omega’s attorney—transferred the world headquarters’
property to a nonprofit called Friendship Foundation.356
Blackston sued Omega, Friendship Foundation, and Carey,
alleging fraudulent conveyance of real property.357 The jury
awarded Blackston $48,895 against Friendship Foundation.358
On the other end of the spectrum, when national
organizations and chapters must pay a judgment because of
members’ actions, plaintiffs may pursue individual fraternity
members in further litigation hoping to recover out of those
defendants’ parents’ homeowner’s insurance.359 Some may look
to recover from the members who personally took part in the
acts that led to the finding of liability.360 Thus, homeowner’s
insurance plays a role in fraternity-related litigation as well,
where the individual member is not independently wealthy or
otherwise judgment-proof.361 It is important to note that the

hospitalized with kidney and spleen damage and in critical condition after a
beating at Omega Psi Phi Fraternity).
352. Blackston, 1999 KY Trial Ct. Rev. LEXIS 628; see also Parks et al.,
White Boys Drink, Black Girls Yell, supra note 3, at 119 (noting that there was
evidence that the regional trainer for the fraternity had knowledge of the
hazing rituals).
353. See Blackston, 1999 KY Trial Ct. Rev. LEXIS 628.
354. Id.
355. Blackston v. Friendship Found. Inc, No. 99-CV-10940, 2002 WL
1353906 (Ga. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 2002), https://perma.cc/743C-NKE6.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. See Kimzey, supra note 17, at 480.
360. Id.
361. See id. at 489.
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typical rules governing cases involving insurance also apply in
the fraternity context, as do the typical rules of exclusions.362
Thus, there are several potential issues plaintiffs face when
relying on homeowners’ policies in hazing litigation. The first
issue involves procedural hurdles, as the court must determine
whether the student qualifies as an insured person under the
parents’ homeowner’s policy.363 Another issue is that
homeowner’s insurance policies generally do not provide
coverage for intentional injuries—which might include sexual
assaults, hazing, fights, or similar injuries.364
An example of the latter issue can be found in Auto-Owners
Insurance Co. v. American Central Insurance Co.365 That case
involves a dispute between insurance carriers over coverage for
the parties in the underlying case Ex parte Barran.366 In Ex
parte Barran, a pledge of the Nu Chapter of Kappa Alpha
fraternity at Auburn University, filed suit against Barran,
Kappa Alpha Order, Inc., and others, alleging that he was
subjected to mental and physical abuse during brutal hazing
incidents.367 The pledge’s allegations included:
(1) having to dig a ditch and jump into it after it had been
filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit;
(2) receiving paddlings to his buttocks; (3) being pushed and
kicked, often into walls, pits, and trash cans; (4) eating such
foods as peppers, hot sauce, butter, and “yerks” (a mixture of
hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items); (5)
doing chores for the fraternity and its members, such as
cleaning the fraternity house and yard, serving as
designated driver, and running errands; (6) appearing
regularly at 2 a.m. “meetings” during which the pledges
would be hazed for a couple of hours; and (7) “running the
gauntlet,” during which the pledges were pushed, kicked,

362. See id. at 485–86.
363. See id. at 483. Such policies usually provide that children of the
insured are covered through a certain age or until completion of college. Id.
364. See id. at 482.
365. 739 So. 2d 1078 (Ala. 1999).
366. 730 So. 2d 203 (Ala. 1998).
367. See id. at 205.
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and hit as they ran down a hallway and down a flight of
stairs.368

Jones argued that Barran and the other defendants
participated in and allowed unlawful hazing tactics to be used
against him; that they intentionally and recklessly caused him
to suffer emotional distress; and that they committed assault
and battery against him.369
After Jones sued Barran, Barran sought defense and
indemnity from American Central under his father’s
homeowner’s insurance policy.370 American Central denied
Barran coverage and refused to indemnify him, claiming that
his father’s policy excluded coverage for Barran’s conduct.371
American Central pointed to the language in the policy,
specifically excluding coverage for “Personal Liability” and
“Medical Payments to Others” resulting from “‘bodily injury’ or
‘property damage’ . . . . [a]rising out of sexual molestation,
corporal punishment or physical or mental abuse.”372
Barran’s defense was subsequently submitted to
Auto-Owners under an umbrella policy that had been issued to
Barran’s father.373 Auto-Owners agreed to defend Barran.374
Auto-Owners then sought a declaratory judgment to determine
its duties and obligations under the umbrella policy, and
American Central’s duties and obligations under the
homeowner’s policy, to defend or indemnify Barran in the
underlying action filed by Jones against Barran.375 Auto-Owners
requested that the trial court hold that American Central owed
primary liability coverage for Barran, that American Central
reimburse Auto-Owners for all defense costs that it incurred,

368.
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370.
371.
372.
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375.
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and that American Central provide Barran’s full and complete
defense.376
The question in Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. American
Central Insurance Co. thus turned on whether Barran’s conduct,
as alleged in Jones’s complaint in the underlying action, Ex
parte Barran, fell within the scope of American Central’s policy
exclusion for injury arising out of “physical or mental abuse.”377
The Supreme Court of Alabama ultimately affirmed the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of American Central
Insurance Company, holding that:
American Central’s exclusion 1.k., excluding coverage for
injury that arises out of “physical or mental abuse,” is
unambiguous. The acts of hazing that Jones alleges were
committed against him, acts that he described in graphic
detail in his complaint, clearly constituted physical and
mental abuse. Therefore, any such acts allegedly committed
by Barran were excluded from coverage under American
Central’s policy of insurance.378

Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. American Central Insurance
Co. illustrates the potentially limited applicability of
homeowner’s insurance policies for specific acts of hazing. It
highlights the common exclusions of coverage for injuries that
are “occurrence-” based or “accident-” based.379 Nonetheless, so
long as a complaint contains some allegation of negligence,
carriers will generally provide a defense, and this can be a
valuable source of recovery for plaintiffs involved in hazing
litigation.380

376. See id. (discussing the trial court’s finding in favor of American
Central, and concluding that, as a matter of law, Jones’s claims against Barran
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CONCLUSION
Hazing has been a high-stakes issue for fraternities and
sororities in recent decades.381 It results in the loss of life,
criminal sanctions for members and organizations, increased
insurance costs, and civil liability for various fraternity and
sorority units, as well as their host institutions.382 While the law
may not be a good deterrent to hazing, it is still a terrain that
must be traversed. As such, litigants should be more aware of
the twists and turns, peaks and valleys of the litigation process.
Hopefully, this Article offered that insight vis-à-vis certain
components of that process.

381. See id. at 460 (noting that fraternities and sororities have become
“fountainheads of liability”).
382. See Susan J. Curry, Hazing and the “Rush” Toward Reform:
Responses from Universities, Fraternities, State Legislatures, and the Courts,
16 J.C. & U.L. 93, 113 (1989).

